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By DEVEN R. DESAI*
"It's a prestigious line of work, with a long and glorious tradition. "I
GENOCIDE BEGINS. CNN breaks the news. Wheels turn. The
United Nations ("UN") calls for investigations. Debates rage. Mean-
while, people die by the thousands. Action must be taken, but how?
Who will go? An international force? A unilateral force? A private
force? And if a force is sent, who will pay? Finally, the UN deploys a
force but only after hundreds of thousands needlessly perish.
Elsewhere, insurgent forces threaten a legitimate government.
The government attempts to quell the uprising, but its less than pro-
fessional military fails and possibly exacerbates the country's unrest.
The group uses extreme violence and soon closes in on the capital.
Sensing the possible mayhem in the capital, countries evacuate per-
sonnel and embassies. All the while the UN, the United States, and
the United Kingdom refuse to provide aid. The embattled govern-
ment has no recourse. But then, the leader of the country remembers
some magazine articles describing a company that might help. He
places a call and, thanks to some financial help from local mining
concerns, within a few weeks military aid arrives, the capital is saved,
and the rebels are driven more than one hundred kilometers away. A
year after the company's arrival, the rebels agree to negotiate for the
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first time, and the country has enough stability to hold a "multiparty
civilian presidential election."2
In yet another part of the world, a country has been thrown into
upheaval on all fronts. Establishing a new government may be the
long term goal, but simpler, more immediate concerns, such as pro-
viding police, establishing rule of law, rebuilding infrastructure after
war damage, and securing the country from external threats, are more
pressing. During the reconstruction efforts, those brought in to aid in
the reconstruction of the society commit heinous crimes-the very
crimes they are there to prevent. Worse, the perpetrators are not sub-
ject to any law and, although fired, face no criminal prosecution for
their acts.
At first glance, one might think the above abstractions are about
events at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the genocide in Darfur.
In a sense they are, but those familiar with the history of two compa-
nies, Executive Outcomes and DynCorp, know the abstractions are
based on real events in Rwanda, 3 Sierra Leone, 4 and Bosnia5 in the
1990s. Groups, such as Executive Outcomes and DynCorp, have been
called mercenaries, security consultants, civilian contractors, private
military companies ("PMCs"), or even "hired guns."6 Regardless of
their title, these groups provide services ranging from consulting to
logistical support to full-fledged armed divisions and are now un-
doubtedly a part of global politics and the global market. As the Brit-
ish House of Commons put it in analyzing how to regulate PMCs,
"[g] iven the evident existence of-and likely growth in-a market for
private military services, military companies will continue to exist."7
2. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY
INDUSTRY 110-13 (2003).
3. For a detailed analysis of the failures in preveiting the genocide in Rwanda see
generally Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 84, 84.
See also SINGER, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting Executive Outcomes proposal for Rwanda
entailing deployment of 1,500 personnel within fourteen days of hire for a cost of $600,000
as opposed to the slower responding UN force, which cost $3 million per day).
4. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 110-13.
5. See Robert Capps, Outside the Law, SALON.COM, June 26, 2002, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/ [hereinafter Capps, Outside] (detail-
ing criminal activities of DynCorp employees in Bosnia).
6. Though this Article seeks to address some of the definitional questions related to
the use of private military services for the sake of clarity the term "PMC" is used through-
out to refer to any private company providing some level of military support across the
spectrum of consulting to fielding active combat groups.
7. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, NINTH REPORT OF SES-
SION 2001-02, H.C. 922, 102.
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The above scenarios highlight the dilemma this Article seeks to
investigate. PMCs can be useful and arguably provide excellent service
while offering swift and needed aid to embattled regions. In addition,
according to some analyses, they appear to do so at lower economic
and political cost to the country or countries that choose to employ
them.8 Still, recent events, such as those in Abu Ghraib and in Bos-
nia,9 raise questions about the privatization of force, including the ne-
cessity or wisdom of privatization at all. 10
Nevertheless, because of the ever-increasing drive to privatize gov-
ernment services and the current entrenched use of PMCs, even if
one believes private military force should never be used, its use will
not likely soon disappear. Yet the same motivations that may lead one
to argue PMC use should be banned also demand that the industry
needs to be regulated. As such, this Article seeks to provide a starting
point for changing the way in which PMCs behave so that transgres-
sions are less likely to occur. And, if transgressions do occur, this Arti-
cle suggests a means of prosecution so that those responsible for the
8. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting Executive Outcomes proposal for
Rwanda entailing deployment of 1500 personnel within fourteen days of hire for a cost of
$600,000 per day as opposed to the slower responding UN force, which cost $3 million per
day). See infra notes 133-138 and accompanying text. But see ANN MARKUSEN, THE CASE
AGAINST PRIVATIZING NATIONAL SEcURrIY, at 2, 5-7 (2001), http://www.gao.gov/a 7 6panel/
fortherecord/amarkusenpaper.pdf (last visited July 8, 2005) (noting potential for cost-sav-
ing but only when competition between bidders is present and controls on corruption are
in place); Deborah Avant, Privatizing Military Training, 7 FOREIGN POL'Y. IN Focus, May
2002, http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol7/06ifmiltrain.pdf (last visitedJune 20, 2005) (question-
ing whether privatizing military services reduces costs and citing Rand studies indicating a
lack of savings unless competition for bids is in place).
9. See generally Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib Prison, NEW YORKER, May 5,
2004, at 42, available at www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa~fact (last visited June
23, 2005); Capps, Outside, supra note 5.
10. For an extended discussion of the philosophical questions surrounding the priva-
tization of force, see generally Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment,
Policing, and Military Force In Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879 (2004). For a perspective
on the inherent difficulties in using PMCs in combat, see generally Maj. Joseph R. Perlak,
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: Implications for Contractor Personne 169 MIL. L.
REV. 92 (2001) (noting the operational and chain of command issues arising when employ-
ing PMCs); see also Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and
Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (2003) (noting that the use of
hired armies, though common throughout history, was feared, and that in the extreme, as
seen in Italy under the condotteieri, such private armies had high influence on state affairs
but did not have allegiance to anything other than the contract); Avant, supra note 8 (ques-
tioning whether privatizing military services reduces costs, warning that it "may actually
weaken the U.S. military's capacity for engagement," noting its ability to avoid congres-
sional and public debate over policy issues, and asserting that in some cases its use can hide
the United States government's actions in contravention of stated foreign-policy and/or
UN policy).
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transgressions may be brought into court. As a result, PMCs may not
so easily escape justice and society would have a forum to better un-
derstand and assess the contours of PMC use. In addition, insofar as
our country intends to continue employing PMCs, this Article is an
invitation for the United States government and the PMC industry to
fashion a workable system allowing for the use of PMCs, while still
safeguarding important individual and governmental interests.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of contracted military
services and PMCs, including their evolution into the modern PMC,
presents the context within which PMCs operate today, and examines
the definitional problem accompanying any discussion of the PMC in-
dustry. Part II sets forth the current issues surrounding the regulation
of the PMC industry, including rights abuses, liability, and govern-
ments' use of the industry to avoid legislative oversight of activities
that may otherwise be prohibited. In addition, the section notes that
despite concerns, governments, non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), and corporations often employ PMCs with great effective-
ness to provide necessary support functions, humanitarian aid, and
field protection for otherwise vulnerable operations. Part III details
the proposals and arguments supporting or opposing regulation of
the PMC industry such as establishing large scale licensing and review
systems. Part IV argues that a layered system combining contract con-
trol and legislation would work together to regulate the industry while
still preserving it as a viable resource for governments, NGOs, and
corporations. The first layer would be the proverbial carrot and the
second layer, the stick. The contract solution, the carrot, offers gov-
ernments and PMCs a role in fashioning a solution that fits their
needs without a large-scale regulatory system dictating their behaviors
or establishing an elaborate and cumbersome licensing system.
In addition, the proposed legislative changes would create a
stick-or several sticks. Part of the legislative solution plugs the major
loopholes that currently exist in the United States. These laws prevent
Congress from having access to information regarding PMC contracts
that are under $50 million and prevent the government from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over violators of those laws. Another part of the pro-
posed legislation provides a way for private actors to bring suit when
the government fails to remedy violations by the PMCs. As such, all
concerned would have additional incentive to adhere to the terms of
the contract and the law. Failing to do so could result in large, public
lawsuits that not only could threaten PMCs financially but also could
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increase demands for acute regulatory systems-precisely what the
government and PMCs wish to avoid."
Specifically, Part IV argues that market-makers are well suited to
rein in and shape industry behavior by requiring certain specific con-
tract provisions regarding human rights training requirements, choice
of law, jurisdiction, and other pertinent issues. Turning to legislation,
Part IV argues that the legislature must amend the Military Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 ("MEJA") 12 so that all military contrac-
tors-not just ones working on Department of Defense ("DOD") or
Department of Justice ("DOJ") projectsl 3-are subject to the Act. Fur-
ther, the legislature must amend MEJA to add a whistleblower statute
similar to the one found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200214 so
problems may be reported without fear of reprisal. Finally, the section
argues that new legislation creating a private right of action (with sig-
nificant thresholds and a specific process for bringing such an action)
should be enacted so that when it appears that PMC activity violates
human rights, international criminal law, or defrauds the United
States government through over-billing, watch dog groups may initiate
lawsuits to remedy the situation-even when political will is lacking.
I. History
A. The Historical and Increased Current Use of PMCs Has
Created a Need for Regulation
The tradition of states using private military services is an ancient
practice that arguably has never gone away. 15 For example, Ramses II,
King David, Alexander the Great, Caesar, Justinian, William the Con-
11. Cf Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-based Remedies for Interna-
tional Human Rights Violations? 40 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 103, 120-121 (2004) (concluding
that corporate social responsibility actions, such as shareholder and public shame, though
not sufficient to prevent human rights abuses by themselves nonetheless can encourage
higher standards, especially when combined with criminal and civil law).
12. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 § 2, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267
(2000).
13. See Enforcing U.S. Policies Against Trafficking in Persons: How is the U.S. Military Do-
ing?: Joint Issue Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services and the Commission on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Martina
Vandenberg), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/Issue%2Forums/Helsinki% 2 09 -
21-04/VandenbergStatement.pdf (last visited June 12, 2005).
14. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (2005).
15. See generally JAMES R. DAviS, FORTUNE'S WARRIORS, 36-45 (2002); SINGER, supra
note 2, at 19-39. For a general collection of essays on the history of mercenaries from 400
B.C. to the 1980s A.D., see MERCS: THE STOIUES OF MERCENARIES IN ACTION (Bill Fawcett
ed., 1999).
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queror, princes of Italian city states, and the British Empire, all em-
ployed foreigners for combat military purposes. 16 As some have put it,
"[h]iring outsiders to fight your battles is as old as war itself,"'17 and
"[t]he sovereign's resort to mercenaries is as old as history itself."' 8
Even the quaint looking Swiss guards of the Papal State trace their
history to the Swiss mercenary companies who dominated the market
for hired military service for close to a century from the late thirteenth
century to the early fifteenth century. 19
Despite the enduring history of hired military services, they have
often been regarded with distrust.20 In recent history, the sensational-
ized images of PMCs during the 1950s and 1960s in Africa-daring,
dangerous, and destabilizing-fueled distrust towards hired private
military services. 21 In addition, some saw European powers and local
African governments as employing PMCs to hinder and arguably
thwart liberation movements. 22 The events culminated in an attempt
to regulate "one type of mercenary, the indiscriminate hired gun who
16. See Milliard, supra note 10, at 2.
17. SINGER, supra note 2, at 19.
18. Milliard, supra note 10, at 2.
19. SINGER, supra note 2, at 26-28.
20. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 13-14 (Peter Bondanella & Mark
Musa eds. & trans., Penguin Books 1995) (1521) (discussing nature of professional soldier-
ing as one needing wars and the ability to engage in "rapacious, fraudulent, violent" acts).
"Washington warned that 'Mercenary Armies... have at one time or another subverted
the liberties of allmost [sic] all the Countries they have been raised to defend....'" Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 n.43 (1955) (omissions in original) (quoting 26 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCR'T SOURCES 388 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1944)). "Madison in The Federalist, No. 41 cautioned '(T)he liberties of Rome proved
the final victim to her military triumphs; and... the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever
existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments.'" Id.
(omission in original) (quoting THE FEOERALIST No. 41 (James Madison)). Accord Milliard,
supra note 10, at 2-10 (tracing historical rise and societal responses to mercenaries).
21. See Milliard, supra note 10, at 43-57 (examining the Organization of African Unity
activities in defining and outlawing the use of mercenaries in light of the growth of merce-
nary use in Africa); see also SINGER, supra note 2, at 37 (noting the era as the "heyday" of
mercenaries and the notoriety of certain groups and individuals including Bob Denard
who led several coups and attempted coups in Africa during the 1970s and an attempted
one in 1995). This image persists and with some reason when figures such as Mark
Thatcher, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's son, are charged with and
implicated in mercenary activity in South Africa and Equatorial Guinea. See Elliot Sylvester,
Associated Press, Mark Thatcher Pleads Guilty to Helping Finance African Coup Plot, Jan. 13,
2005, 1/13/05 APALER=TX 12:42:25 (Westlaw).
22. See Milliard, supra note 10, at 4 ("The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist
regimes against the national liberation movements struggling for their freedom and inde-
pendence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a crimi-
nal act and mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals." Id. at n.16 (quoting
G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973)).
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ran roughshod over African .self-determination movements in the
post-colonial period from 1960 to 1980."23 Appropriately, a PMC
would not wish to be deemed a mercenary when the term carried such
condemnation. Yet in other situations, PMCs have been seen as pro-
viding a valuable, "critical" service to military efforts, such as in Viet-
nam where the DOD hired civilian contractors to provide significant
logistical support to the military ranging from trucking to port opera-
tion to construction and more.24
In 1969 the United States Army ("Army") reached the zenith of
its PMC use in Vietnam with annual contracts totaling $236 million
and the United States Army Procurement Agency of Vietnam hiring
9000 civilian employees. 25 By 1985, the Army formalized procedures
for outsourcing logistical support under the Logistics Civil Augmenta-
tion Program ("LOGCAP"), requiring contractors to be ready to pro-
vide logistical support on short notice and often with few set
requirements until well after an engagement had begun.2 6 The Army
awarded its first LOGCAP contract to a company recognizable to some
familiar with the Iraq War: Brown and Root Services Corporation
("Brown and Root"). 27
In the 1980s and 1990s PMCs were employed in a variety of capac-
ities across the world. For example, corporations have hired PMCs to
provide security for their investments in unstable regions, such as
Mozambique. 28 Countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Croatia,
and Bosnia, hired PMCs to train and equip their forces. 29 In 1997
alone, Africa reportedly had some ninety different PMCs present and
23. See id.
24. See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with
Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 235 (2000); cf. Avant, supra note
8 (noting that in the 1950s and 1960s the British and United States governments used
PMCs for "overt and covert military missions," calling PMCs a "subset" of typical "merce-
nary activity" and acknowledging reports of contractors in Vietnam being involved in "ille-
gal activit[y]").
25. See Davidson, supra note 24, at 235.
26. See id. at 237 (noting that though the other branches of the military may use LOG-
CAP, the Navy and Air Force have developed their own systems for outsourcing).
27. Id. at 237-38.
28. See Sebastian Mallaby, Editorial, Paid to Make Peace, WASH. PosT, June 4, 2001, at
A19, (noting British company Lonrho's hiring of a PMC outfit to secure and protect cotton
field Lonrho had purchased).
29. See Avant, supra note 8; Matthew Quirk, Private Military Contractors: A Buyer's Guide,
ATLArNTIc MONTHLY, Sept. 2004, at 39, 39, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/
prem/200409/quirk.
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providing security to oil and mining companies3 0-not to mention
the PMCs to whom United States military training has been out-
sourced during the 1990s. 31 In addition, the United States has spent
$1.2 billion a year using PMCs as part of the war on drugs in Colom-
bia,3 2 and the UN has hired PMCs to provide security to their aid
efforts.33
B. Present Day Context: The Influence of PMCs Peaks
While one perception may be that the practice of paying people
or companies in the private sector to aid or even conduct military
operations is a new phenomenon, history shows that such practices
are quite old. Likewise, the perception that such practices-especially
when deemed mercenary-are uniformly reviled is not shown histori-
cally either. In addition, because it appears that today's PMC use is
hitting a peak in terms of the quantity of contracts going to the indus-
try and in terms of the wide range of projects for which they are hired,
the current interest and concern regarding PMC use is merited. Fur-
thermore, right now and for the near future it appears that wherever
there is any level of military activity, PMCs will exist in large numbers
and often handle large parts of a deployment's operation.34 Thus, reg-
ulation is necessary.
Three factors have fueled the growth of the private military indus-
try since the end of the Cold War: (1) large scale reduction of military
forces after the Cold War, which created a surplus of trained military
personnel withoutjobs; (2) the policy shift to privatizing government
services whenever possible; and (3) an increase in regional conflicts.35
As set forth below, these factors converged to create a PMC industry
that operates in a new way with more money and more influence on
30. See David Isenberg, Soldiers of Fortune Ltd: A Profile of Today s Private Sector Corporate
Mercenary Firms, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO. MONOGRAPH, Nov. 1997, available at http://
www.totse.com/en/politics/us_military/armylove.html (last visited July 10, 2005).
31. See Avant, supra note 8.
32. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Noshua Watson, The Pentagon's Private Army, FORTUNE,
Mar. 17, 2003, at 100, 103, available at 2003 WLNR 13891324 ("At least a half-dozen compa-
nies, including AirScan, Northrop Grumman, and DynCorp, receive up to $ 1.2 billion a
year from the Pentagon and the State Department to fly the planes that spray suspected
coca fields and to monitor smugglers from remote radar sites"); see also Avant, supra note 8
(noting United States hiring of PMC use in war on drugs).
33. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 184-85.
34. Accord Rosky, supra note 10, at 912 (examining the evolution of the privatization
of military force and concluding that "[b]y all accounts, the revival of PMCs has barely
begun"); infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
35. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 103.
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how war is conducted than ever before, such that PMCs appear argua-
bly indispensable in the current way the United States military
operates.
The abundance of unemployed, trained military professionals has
led to significant changes within the PMC industry. From 1989 to
2002, worldwide military forces shrank by seven million, 36 creating a
surplus of unemployed military personnel. Concurrent with this, gov-
ernments worldwide mandated increased outsourcing and privatiza-
tion. The general shift towards privatization began with Margaret
Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in the 1980s and
continued through the 1990s with the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. Additionally, privatized military forces were key to the
transition of former Soviet bloc countries into liberal democracies.37
In the United States this policy can be traced to a document called
Circular A-76,38 which was issued in 1983 by President Ronald Rea-
gan's budget director David Stockman.3 9 Circular A-76 simply and di-
rectly initiated privatization of United States government services by
requiring that the United States government "rely on commercial
sources to supply the products and services the Government needs. '40
Indeed, these policies took hold so fast that one commentator noted
that the belief that free market privatization of United States govern-
ment services "maximize[s] efficiency and effectiveness" and drove
globalization and privatization such that "[b]y 1998, the rate of global
privatization was roughly doubling each year."41
It is no surprise that the United States military followed this path.
As one general, who laterjoined the boards of private military compa-
nies, put it, "'I am unabashedly an admirer of outsourcing ....
There's very few things in life you can't outsource."' 42 Applying this
36. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 53; see also Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 104
("Back in 1991, when American troops last faced down Saddam Hussein, the Army had
711,000 active-duty troops. Today it has 487,000-a 32% drop."); Isenberg, supra note 30
(noting worldwide force reduction from 28,320,000 personnel in 1987 to 23,500,000 in
1994).
37. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 66-67; see also Rosky, supra note 10, at 896-913 (tracing
the shift towards privatizing the use of force).
38. See Dan Baum, Nation Builders for Hire, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2003, § 6 (Magazine),
at 32.
39. Id.
40. See id.; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-76 (1983), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/aO76.html
(last visited June 20, 2005).
41. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 67.
42. See Baum, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey from a 2000
Dallas Morning News interview).
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principle has resulted in the United States military outsourcing
kitchen patrol, laundry, and recruiting-in short, outsourcing "as
many tasks as possible to enable the military... to focus on its core
competency: fighting."43 This drive to outsource is so strong and prev-
alent that the head of DynCorp, one of the largest private military
companies in the United States, summed up the relationship between
the United States military and the private military industry as essen-
tially welded together, "You could fight without us, but it would be
difficult .... Because we're so involved, it's difficult to extricate us
from the process."44 A stark example of the PMC industry's inter-
twined relationship with the United States military is found in one
company, Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. ("KBR"), a subsidiary of Halli-
burton Company.
KBR has a history of profiting from United States government
contracts. Today, the company has become familiar to the public
through its activities in post-war Iraq and because of Vice President
Cheney's relationship to the firm as the former chairman of Hallibur-
ton.45 This fact has led United States Representative Henry Waxman
to wonder whether the government, based on Mr. Cheney's relation-
ship to the company, was giving KBR an "inside track"46 on contracts
to rebuild the Iraqi oil industry; contracts that could possibly be worth
$7 billion.47 As one author points out, however, "[t]he reality is sub-
tler: KBR didn't need any help. It is by now so enmeshed with the
Pentagon that it was able essentially to assign the contract to itself."
48
KBR was given the Iraq contract based on its ability to meet the
United States Army's contingency plan for rebuilding Iraq; KBR pre-
pared that contingency plan as part of its duties under the LOGCAP
contract it won in an open-bidding process in 2001.49
43. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 102.
44. See id. (quoting Paul Lombardi, CEO of DynCorp).
45. See T. Christian Miller, Worries Raised on Handling of Funds in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, June
22, 2005, at A8, available at 2005 WLNR 9820777 [hereinafter Miller, Worries]; accord Sam
Allis, Facing Down Privatization of War, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 2005, at El (noting $12
billion in contracts to Halliburton, Vice President Cheney's role in hiring Halliburton
when he was Secretary of Defense, and Vice President's Cheney's tenure as CEO of Halli-
burton before joining President George W. Bush's 2000 election ticket).
46. See Baum, supra note 38, at 32, 34.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 34 (noting LOGCAP "essentially turns KBR into a kind of for-profit Minis-
try of Public Works for the Army. Under Logcap ... KBR is on call to the Army for 10 years
to do a lot of the things most people think soldiers do for themselves-from fixing trucks
to warehousing ammunition, from delivering mail to cleaning up hazardous waste. KP. is
history; KBR civilians now peel potatoes, and serve them, at many installations. KBR does
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KBR is not alone in eyeing and receiving United States govern-
ment contracts. Prior to the United States' invasion of Iraq, it was esti-
mated that the Pentagon alone would have spent at least "$30
billion-or 8% of its overall budget, on private military companies.
50
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Fortune 500 and S&P 500 compa-
nies have taken notice of the potential profits. For example, in late
2002 Computer Sciences Corporation purchased DynCorp for close to
$1 billion; a move that may have been spurred in part by L-3 Commu-
nications' 2000 purchase of another major United States based PMC,
Military Professional Resources Incorporated ("MPRI"), for $35
million. 51
Thus, regardless of what opinion one has of the PMC industry,
one thing is certain: it is growing and profitable. Indeed, even during
the high flying 1990s stock market publicly held PMCs saw their stock
grow at "twice the rate of the DowJones Industrial Average." 52 In addi-
tion, the industry is not limited to mega-corporations. One company
on the S&P small cap index, Cubic Corporation,5 3 has focused on
electronic defense systems and training to its great benefit. Cubic Cor-
poration's profits "rose 41% in fiscal 2002," and its stock price tripled
between 1999 and 2003.54
What, then, is the size of the United States PMC industry market?
Given that any one of numerous United States government agencies
administer the contract, often with no requirement to notify Con-
the laundry. It fixes the pipes and cleans the sewers, generates the power and repairs the
wiring. It built some of the bases used in the Iraq war."); see also Davidson, supra note 24, at
237-39 and surrounding explanation of LOGCAP.
50. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 102.
51. See id. MPRI's price tag may reflect its claim to be able to call 12,000 military and
law enforcement personnel to staff projects. See MPRI, Our Team, http://www.mpri.com/
site/our-team.html (last visited June 23, 2005) ("MPRI maintains and draws its workforce
from a carefully managed and current database of more than 12,500 former defense, law
enforcement, and other professionals, from which the company can identify every skill
produced in the armed forces and public safety sectors."). Of similar or perhaps greater
value may be MPRI's more than 1500 permanent employees. See MPRI, About MPRI, http:/
/www.mpri.com/site/about.html (last visited June 23, 2005). Indeed, one MPRI executive
boasted "We've got more generals per square foot here than in the Pentagon"-likely a
large benefit in obtaining lucrative government contracts. See Esther Schrader, United States
Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, April 14, 2002, at Al (quoting Army Lt.
Gen. Harry E. Soyster, Ret.).
52. See Avant, supra note 8.
53. See Cubic Corp. Home Page, http://www.cubic.com (last visited July, 11, 2005).
54. See Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 102 (citing PIT-rSBURGH POsT GAzETTE).
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gress, the exact size of the market is difficult to determine. 55 Nonethe-
less, one study conducted in 1997 estimated the global market will
grow "from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010."56 In addi-
tion, from 1994 to 2002 the United States DOD alone spent more
than $300 billion on more than 3,000 contracts.5 7 Thus, despite the
opacity of the industry and the process by which the United States
government hires PMCs one can see that, even if the DOD alone
spent the same amount for each year from 1994 to 2002, its portion of
the world market would be $33.3 billion-a large part of the esti-
mated worldwide market even though the 1997 study could not in-
clude the recent increase in spending in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Indeed, the events of September 11, 2001 have likely increased
the market's size. For example, through July 2004 the private military
contracts awarded to United States companies for the Iraq and Af-
ghanistan reconstruction are more than $50 billionSS-with Hallibur-
ton's contracts in Iraq alone amounting to more than $10 billion.59
Furthermore, lest one think that only states hire PMCs, non-state ac-
55. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 78 (noting lack of transparency in the industry and
resulting difficulty in estimating its size); see also FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITrEE, PRIVATE MIu-
TARY COMPANIES, NINrH REPORT OF SESSION 2001-02, H.C. 922, 17.
We conclude that the lack of centrally held information on contracts between
Government Departments and private military companies is unacceptable. We
recommend that the Government take immediate steps to collect such informa-
tion and to update it regularly. We further recommend that in its response to this
Report the Government publish a comprehensive list of current contracts be-
tween Government Departments and private military companies and private se-
curity companies.
Id.
56. Esther Schrader, U.S. Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, at Al, (citing 1997 study by Equitable Services Corp.); see also INTERNATIONAL ALERT,
THE POLITICISATION OF HUMANITARIAN AcTION AND STAFF SECURITY 1, 2 (2001),
www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/Tuftrep.pdf (last visited June 15, 2005) (estimat-
ing growth to $202 billion by 2010).
57. See Peter Singer, Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services? HUMANITARAN
AFF. REv., Summer 2004, at 14-15, available at http://www.humanitarian-review.org/
upload/pdf/SingerEnglishFinal.pdf [hereinafter Singer, Humanitarians] (last visited June
15, 2005).
58. See The Center for Public Integrity, Post-War Contractors Ranked by Total Contract Value in
Iraq and Afghanistan From 2002 Through July 1, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/
resources.aspx?act=total (last visited June 15, 2005).
59. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 108TH CONG., FACT SHEET
HALLIBURTON'S IRAQ CONTRAcTs Now WORTH OVER $10 BILLION (2004), http://demo-
crats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20041209093532-66409.pdf (last visited June 15,
2005); see also Minority Staff of H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong., Media Spread-
sheet for AFSC LOGCAP (2004), http://democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/
20041209093914-57358.pdf (listing, as of December 9, 2004, LOGCAP contracts in Iraq at
more than $9 billion) (last visited June 15, 2005).
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tors, such as the UN, regional security groups, NGOs, and corpora-
tions, hire them as well.
60
In sum, the PMC industry can have several large companies pro-
viding a broad range of services and numerous small companies filling
niche sectors of the market. Indeed, one large company, many small
companies, or a combination of both may provide services on a single
project, thus presenting additional difficulties in regulating the mar-
ket. Are some activities simply to be banned? Does one establish a
licensing regime? What happens when a company provides services
across the spectrum of possible activities? What happens when a com-
pany hired to perform one task assumes another role because of the
necessities of battle or a simple request by the field office for ex-
panded services? 61
These questions often have a general question latent in them:
How does one define the industry and those in it?
C. Defining "Mercenary" Groups and Regulating "Mercenary"
Activities Provides Inadequate Protection Against PMC
Transgressions
If one merely perceives PMCs as soldiers of fortune or amoral
mercenary groups, one misses the fact that the PMC industry consists
of a spectrum of companies from those providing full scale, combat
engaged personnel and services (including lethal ones) to those pro-
viding purely non-lethal, support functions. Indeed, given that merce-
nary services are banned under international law, no PMC would wish
to be deemed mercenary under such laws.62 Accordingly, interna-
tional organizations, states,63 commentators, and members of the pro-
60. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 182.
61. See Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing the War, SALON.COM, Apr. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer2O040416.htm (noting "[w]hen con-
tractor units are attacked, they must deal with the situation" and that despite restrictions
against carrying "heavy weaponry" some have taken to buying grenades and plan on acquir-
ing other such weapons to protect themselves.) [hereinafter Singer, Outsourcing].
62. See International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Train-
ing of Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/
44/49/Annex (Dec. 4, 1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89, 91 (1990); Organization of African
Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, art. 1 opened for signature
July 3, 1977, 1490 U.N.T.S. 96, 96-97; see also Ellen Frye, Private Military Firms in the New
World Order: How Redefining "Mercenary" Can Tame the "Dogs of War," 73 FoRDHan L. REv.
2607, 2626-2631 (2005) (tracing customary law and UN actions affecting and commenting
on mercenary use and noting that General Assembly Resolution 2465 was the first time the
UN explicitly deemed mercenary activity criminal).
63. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the Ukraine have passed anti-mercenary
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fession have sought to distinguish the different types of services
available in the current industry as part of efforts to establish a regime
to regulate it and/or create a method of distinguishing between mer-
cenary and legitimate, non-mercenary activity. The section below ex-
amines the primary ways groups have defined mercenary by setting
forth the rather detailed, intricate language the attempts have em-
ployed. The purpose of this examination is in part to demonstrate
that the attempts yield complicated but unworkable or toothless re-
strictions that fail to provide meaningful parameters within which
PMC services should operate.
International law provides a definition of mercenary and pros-
cribes mercenary activities. 64 The British House of Commons report,
Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation ("Report") -aimed at
"outlining options for the control of private military companies which
operate out of the [United Kingdom], its dependencies, and the Brit-
ish Islands"65 found:
[T]he most widely used legal definition of a mercenary is very nar-
row. Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1997 to the Ge-
neva Conventions defines a mercenary as one who:
(a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the de-
sire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of
a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in
laws. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULA-
TION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, Annex B, at 39-43, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/merce-
naries,0.pdf (noting "[flew countries have national legislation on PMCs" and detailing
varying levels of state prohibitions, noting the rarity of prosecution under any of the coun-
tries' laws). Several United States Acts regulate the provisions of military services. The Arms
Export Control Act ("AECA") of 1968 as implemented via the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations ("ITAR") sets forth a license requirement for companies providing military
advice, services, or sales to foreign countries and requires that sales of more than $50
million be reported to Congress. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2000);
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.8 (2004). The United States
Foreign Relations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 958 (2000) prohibits anyone on United States soil from
recruiting United States citizens for a foreign army when the United States is at peace with
the country against which the foreign country is at war. Yet the United States does not have
a distinct ban on mercenaries; accord Frye, supra note 62, at 2633-2636.
64. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULA-
TION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, 4-16, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf
(examining PMC industry and possible regulatory systems including reviewing United Na-
tions, and Organization of African States laws regarding mercenaries); accord DAvis, supra
note 15, at 49-66.
65. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULA-
TION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, 1.
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excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks
and functions in the armed forces of that party;
(d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict;
and
(f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of the armed forces.
It should be noted that this definition is cumulative, i.e., a merce-
nary is defined as someone to whom all of the above apply.
6 6
The Report also notes:
An alternative definition is provided by the OAU Convention for
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. This defines a merce-
nary as anyone who is not a national of the state against which his
actions are directed, is employed, enrols [sic] or links himself will-
ingly to a person, group or organisation whose aim is:
(a) to overthrow by force of arms or by any other means, the gov-
ernment of that Member State of the Organisation of African
Unity;
(b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or nor-
mal working institutions of the said State;
(c) to block by any means the activities of any liberation move-
ment recognised by the Organisation of African Unity.
67
Though interesting, the international law definitions are not use-
ful. As the Report notes, "A number of governments including the
British Government regard [the Geneva Convention] definition as un-
workable," because determining the motives of an actor is by its na-
ture impractical, and one can easily devise a contract to place the
contractor outside the definition. 68 The Organisation of African Unity
("OAU") definition has also been eschewed as biased and too narrow
to address fully the range of activities that might be mercenary in na-
ture. 69 Under one analysis, the laws against mercenaries are ineffective
to the point that one PMC insider stated that anyone even prosecuted
under such laws "deserves to 'be shot and their lawyer beside
them."' 7 0 Accordingly, some have tried to fashion a new definition, or
66. Id. 5 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. 7.
68. Id. 6 (noting Sandline International's use of the term Special Constables "in its
aborted contract with Papua New Guinea" so "they would thus not have been classified as
mercenaries since .... they would have been members of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict" and in "cases of foreign nationals providing military services who have been
granted or have applied for local citizenship with the effect that ... they could not be
described as mercenaries.").
69. Id. 8; see also DAviS, supra note 15, at 52-53.
70. SINGER, SUpra note 2, at 238 (citing private correspondence).
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at least a framework from which to understand, categorize, and then
regulate the industry.71
For example, Peter Singer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Insti-
tution and prolific author regarding the PMC industry,72 offers a cate-
gorization system that borrows the military's "tip of the spear"
metaphor to define PMCs.73 As Singer details, this system recognizes
"three broad types of units linked to their location in the battle space:
those that operate within the general theater, those in the theater of
war, and those in the actual area of operations, that is, the tactical
battlefield. '74 Following the military metaphor, Singer's system identi-
fies three types of private military companies: (1) Military Provider
Firms, at the frontline or tip of the spear and providing Implementa-
tion and Command services; (2) Military Consultant Firms, in the
middle of the spear and providing Advisory and Training services; and
(3) Military Support Firms, furthest away from the tip and providing
Non-Lethal Aid and Assistance. 75
Singer is not alone in trying to distinguish among the types of
companies and services available within the industry. James Davis, a
professional within the industry, also offers a classification system. In
trying to facilitate "a serious examination of who or what exactly con-
stitutes a mercenary," Davis creates a system aimed at delineating be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate types of mercenaries. 76 According to
Davis, " [t] he four legitimate, acceptable categories of mercenaries are
the: 1. Regular Foreign Unit, 2. Auxiliary Foreign Unit, 3. Foreign Vol-
unteer; and 4. Private Military Company." 77
Davis defines Regular Foreign Units as "long-serving regular for-
mations that exist internally within a larger national military structure
activity... [such as] the French Foreign Legion, the Gurkhas, and the
Swiss Guards." 78 Auxiliary Foreign Units are units "formed during a
conflict and then disbanded on an end to hostilities... [such as] the
Flying Tigers. '79 Private Military Companies are "privately run merce-
nary organizations that conduct combat or combat support operations
71. See infra notes 72-83.
72. See Brookings Scholar: Peter W. Singer, http://www.brookings.edu/scholars/fel-
lows/psinger.htm (last visited July 9, 2005).
73. SINGER, supra note 2, at 91.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. DAvIS, supra note 15, at 74.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 68.
79. Id.
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[who are] officially unaligned .. . [such as] Sandline International
and the former Executive Outcomes."80 Foreign Volunteers are "for-
eign soldiers who are not formed specifically into foreign units but are
incorporated into regular national formations... [such as the individ-
uals who serve in] the British army,... the Israeli army, the Rhodesian
army of the 1970s, and the American Army of the Vietnam era."81
Davis sets forth a fifth category, Freebooters, as the illegitimate
"really objectionable elements of the mercenary trade. '8 2 For Davis
the distinction lies in seven conditions that the legitimate mercenary
would meet and the Freebooter would not.8 3 These distinctions are:
1. That the occupation of the mercenary must be directly linked
with the occupation of soldier;
2. That the candidate must operate either in uniform common to
a body of mercenary troops or in the recognized uniform of the
client state's armed forces, including insignias and rank;
3. That the candidate must be paid for his services;
4. That the candidate must conduct his operations in a nation
other than that of his birth or naturalization regardless of
changes in government to the home state;
5. That the candidate must take a direct role in either the conduct
of combat operations or in supplying combat support... ;
6. That the candidate must be engaged by (a) an internationally
recognized nation; or (b) in the event of a civil dispute, by a
legitimate interim government that represents a significant por-
tion of the population and has been recognized by a minimum
of one foreign nation;
7. That the candidate must be seen to recognize and conduct him-
self by the Laws of War, the Geneva Conventions and the Inter-
national Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms.84
For all the effort to define or classify who or what constitutes a
mercenary, both Singer's and Davis' systems leave open the same is-
sues identified by the report of the British House of Commons. In
analyzing the PMC industry for possible regulation by the British Gov-
ernment, the Report examined the world of PMCs and found-just as
Singer and Davis did-that one may break providers into several types
(mercenaries, volunteers, servicemen enlisted in foreign armies, de-
fense industrial companies, and private military companies) with each
80. Id.
81. Id. at 68-69.
82. Id. at 69.
83. Id. at 74-75.
84. Id.
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providing many types of services (advice, training, logistic support,
monitoring personnel, and de-mining).85 Yet the Report concluded:
The internationally agreed [upon] definitions have been shaped to
suit the agendas of those drafting them and are not necessarily very
useful. The fact is that there are a range of operators in this field
who provide a spectrum of military services abroad. It is possible to
devise different labels according to the activities concerned, the
intention behind them and the effect they may have; but in prac-
tice the categories will often merge into one another.86
In short, fixed definitions or categorizations systems may provide
some guidelines and insight into the general way the PMC industry
works, but because of the nature of PMCs, a precise definition cannot
be found and will not instruct world bodies, international organiza-
tions, courts, and others how to regulate these major players on the
world scene.
H. Practical Concerns Require a More Effective Solution
Though a hard and fast definition may not be attainable, the ef-
forts to understand the industry and parse out the different aspects of
the actors and their services reveal practical issues concerning how to
protect human rights. What happens when a contractor commits
crimes such as murder, rape, or theft but that do not violate interna-
tional criminal laws? Who is accountable for PMCs' actions? What
groups other than states hire PMCs? In addition, the potentially bene-
ficial use of PMCs makes it difficult, if not absurd, to ban the use of
PMCs outright. Accordingly, examining these issues, though not pro-
viding a definition of what PMC activities should be controlled, may
reveal a way to regulate the industry and address the major practical
concerns surrounding employment of PMCs.
A. Human Rights
The recent events at Abu Ghraib prison highlight the most severe
and, in a sense, classic problems associated with outsourcing military
functions to groups who might be deemed mercenaries: the extreme,
unethical, and inhumane treatment of other human beings without
proper accountability.8 7 A report on the occurrences prepared by Ma-
jor General Antonio M. Taguba detailed severe abuses including:
85. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITrEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULA-
TION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, 9-10, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf.
86. Id. 16.
87. See generally Hersh, supra note 9, at 42.
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Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on de-
tainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees
with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with
rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a de-
tainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his
cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a
broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intim-
idate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually
biting a detainee. 88
In analyzing how such abuses could have occurred, the report
points to military personnel in charge of the prison, but it also points
to civilian contractors who worked for CACI International, a PMC
hired to provide interrogation services in Iraq and whose personnel
were implicated in the Abu Ghraib prison abuse.89 Other reports into
Abu Ghraib have shown civilian contractors' presence and involve-
ment in more than a third of the reports of abuse at the prison includ-
ing rape and assault.90
The Abu Ghraib incident is not the first time contractors have
been tied to criminal behavior.91 Similar problems occurred when
DynCorp, one of the largest private military firms, won a contract plac-
ing its employees in Bosnia to aid in the reconstruction efforts.92 Sev-
eral DynCorp employees were implicated in the buying and selling of
women and girls (one allegedly as young as twelve) as prostitutes. 93
DynCorp settled two wrongful termination suits where employees
were allegedly fired for trying to report the problems. 94 Despite this
negative history, DynCorp currently has a contract to train police in
Iraq.95
One striking similarity between the Abu Ghraib and Bosnia
events is that the private military employees face no criminal charges.
88. Id. (quoting Hearing, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Bri-
gade (the "Taguba Report")).
89. Id.
90. See Peter W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2004, at B03, available at http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/singer2004O9l2.htm
[hereinafter Singer, Contract].
91. See Capps, Outside, supra note 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Robert Capps, Sex-slave Whistle-blowers Vindicated, SALON.coM, Aug. 6, 2002,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/08/06/dyncorp/ (last visited June 20, 2005)
[hereinafter Capps, Sex-Slave].
95. See Andrea Mitchell, The Cost of Training Iraqi Police, MSNBC INrERAcrivE, Nov. 4,
2003, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3404605/ (last visitedJune 20, 2005) (noting DynCorp's
contracts to screen and train police in Bosnia, Haiti, and Iraq and the initial Iraq contract
value of $50 million with expected training costs to reach $800 million).
Summer 2005] HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
In Abu Ghraib, several military personnel will face military courts, but
it appears that none of the civilian contractors will.96 Similarly in Bos-
nia, the employees accused of wrongdoing were merely fired.97
Other events implicating human rights have ended similarly.98
For example, while working for the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") in Peru, Aviation Development Corporation downed a mis-
sionary plane mistaking it for a drug transport.99 The event resulted
only in a settlement with the family of the victims and their church
with no admission of wrongdoing.100 In 1998, AirScan, 10 1 who had
been hired by Occidental Petroleum to track rebels and protect its
Colombian pipeline, was implicated in "plan[ning] and support [ing]"
an attack by the Colombian military against a rebel group. 10 2 The at-
tack resulted in the bombing of the town of Santo Domingo where
eleven adults and seven children were killed.10 3 AirScan pilots who
provided video surveillance of the area on the day of the bombing and
96. See Nonna Gorilovskaya, Contracting Justice, MOTHER JONES, June 11, 2004,
www.motherjones.com/news/dailymojo/2004/06/06_513.html (last visited June 20,
2005); see Singer, Contract, supra note 90; accord Joseph Neff & Jay Price, Courts to Resolve
Military Contractors Deaths, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) Jan. 9, 2005, at Al, 2005 WLNR
28225 (stating "[i]f there is any doubt that private contractors work in a legal limbo, com-
pare the experiences of the military and the contractors when it comes to criminal charges.
The military justice system has investigated and prosecuted hundreds of soldiers in Iraq,
from alcohol-related charges to murder to the torture of inmates at the Abu Ghraib prison.
But Singer and others say they can't find a single criminal charge filed against any of the
20,000 contractors working in Iraq over the past two years, even the six civilian contractors
implicated in abuse at Abu Ghraib.")
In addition, Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), the interim government of Iraq,
explicitly granted immunity to contractors. See Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17
(Revised) (2004), § 4.3, available at www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_
17_Status of CoalitionRevwithAnnex A.pdf (last visited June 24, 2005).
97. See Capps, Outside, supra note 5; see also Robert Capps, Crime Without Punishment,
SALON.COM, June 27, 2002, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/27/military/
(noting that forces deployed to Bosnia were not prosecuted either because local authori-
ties did not believe they had jurisdiction to do so, and in the case of anyone working for
the UN the personnel had immunity) [hereinafter Capps, Crime]; Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking
of Women and Cirls to Post-Conflict Bosnia and Heyzegovina for Forced Prostitution, 14 HuM. RTS.
WATCH 1, 46-48 (2002).
98. See Capps, Crime, supra note 97.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. AirScan offers aerial surveillance and security services. See Thomas Cattan, The Oil
Industry: Calmly Keeping the Wheels of Industry Oiled, FT.coM, June 24, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 10109079 (noting Airscan contracts in Iraq and Columbia). The AirScan web site
simply displays the company's name, logo, and the words "Airborne surveillance and secur-
ity services." See AirScan Inc., www.airscan.com (last visited on July 8, 2005).
102. See T. Christian Miller, A Colombian Town Caught in the Crossfire, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Miller, Columbian]; see also Capps, Crime, supra note 97.
103. See Miller, Columbian, supra note 102, at Al; see also Capps, Crime, supra note 97.
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could help resolve questions regarding the bomb's source have been
unreachable because they no longer work for AirScan. 10 4 AirScan
claims not to know the men's whereabouts. 10 5
Thus, despite any claims one could make about the benefits of
hiring PMCs, one can see that in many circumstances hiring PMCs
implicates serious human rights and criminal law issues that demand
some greater level of accountability than is currently in place.
B. Accountability
When addressing human rights and criminal law concerns, the
accountability of those who violate those rights and laws is a key issue.
Accountability for such transgressions ensures that they are less likely
to occur, and if they do, that punishment will be swift and just. Closely
related to that type of accountability are the questions of who is ac-
countable for hiring the PMC and who defines the parameters of their
duties. Who provides oversight of the United States government's use
of PMCs to take part in conflicts and activities to effect policies that
the government otherwise could not pursue? What types of controls
exist over these activities? For example, some argue that the United
States hired MPRI in Bosnia in part to avoid congressional or public
input on the matter.10 6 PMC operations in Colombia are another ex-
cellent case of hiring PMCs to avoid congressional and public scrutiny.
"Plan Colombia," a $7.5 billion United States plan to eradicate the
drug trade in Colombia, provides significant financial and military aid
to the Colombian government in its efforts to stem the flow of
drugs. 10 7 But the plan also contains distinct limits regarding.soldiers:
they may aid in counter-narcotic actions but not counter-insurgency
actions.108 Consequently, the United States executive branch has
hired several PMCs to provide precisely the type of aid Congress pro-
scribed in approving Plan Colombia. 10 9
A problem in creating accountability at either the individual or
political institutional level lies in a large loophole in United States law
that allows for gaps in congressional oversight of PMC activity. Much
104. See Miller, Columbian, supra note 102, at Al.
105. See id.
106. See generally Isenberg, supra note 30.
107. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 206.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 207-09 (detailing MPRI's involvement in drafting a review of the Colom-
bian military and its involvement with three phases of Plan Colombia as well as DynCorp's
use of helicopter gunships to carry out operations in Colombia including firing at rebels;
all without having to advise or inform Congress of the activities).
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of PMC activity is governed by the International Traffic in Arms Regu-
lations ("ITAR"), 110 which concerns the brokering or provision of "fi-
nancing, transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other
action that facilitates the manufacture, export, or import of a defense
article or defense service," and is managed by the Department of
State.111 If the contract is for less than $50 million, Congress need not
be notified. 112 For many contracts, therefore, Congress is not notified
about PMC action, and there is no government body overseeing their
actions. 1 3 By analogy, when the United Kingdom began investigating
its own use of PMCs it found that records of how many contracts and
to whom they went were conspicuously absent.1 14 In the United States,
the Pentagon has said that it "has no idea how many PMC workers it
actually employs."115 This lack of governmental knowledge shows that
at the very least a system with increased accountability for PMCs will
require improved methods and/or requirements regarding Congres-
sional oversight of PMC use.
110. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120.8 (2005).
111. See SAMI MAKKI ET AL., PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AND THE PROLIFERATION OF
SMALL ARMS: REGULATING THE ACTORS 13, 17, http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pub-
sec/Btb-brflO.pdf (last visited June 12, 2005).
112. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2776(c)(1) (West 2005); accord MatthewJ. Gaul, Regulating the
New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Resprisal Clause,
31 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1489, 1518 (1998) ("The primary problem with the [Arms Export
Control Act's] reporting provisions is that they require congressional review of military
service contracts only when a contract exceeds $50 million.") (citing 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 2776(c) (1) (West Supp. 1997)); see also Avant, supra note 8; Peter W. Singer, War, Profits,
and the Vacuum of International Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 539 (2004) [hereinafter Singer, War].
113. See Avant, supra note 8.
114. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMrITTEE, PRIVATE MITrrARv COMPANIES, NINTH REPORT OF SES-
SION 2001-02, H.C. 922, 15-17 ("We conclude that the lack of centrally held information
on contracts between Government Departments and private military companies is unac-
ceptable. We recommend that the Government take immediate steps to collect such infor-
mation and to update it regularly.").
115. See Joshua Kurlantzick, Outsourcing the Dirty Work, 14 AM. PROSPECT, May 2003, at
17, 18, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/5/kurlantzick-j.html (last visited
June 20, 2005) ("PMCs that obtain Pentagon contracts worth less than $50 million do not
have to notify Congress, and the Pentagon has admitted it has no idea how many PMC
workers it actually employs."); accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE BUDGET:
NEED TO STRENGTHEN GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS COSTS, 20
(2002) (noting Department of Defense's lack of knowledge regarding number of contrac-
tors in the Balkans, nature of the contracted work, and "government obligations
to ... contractors under their contracts.").
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C. Peacekeeping, Non-Governmental Organizations, and
Corporations' Use of PMCs
The use of PMCs is not reserved for states. The UN, regional se-
curity organizations, and NGOs use PMCs to intervene in unstable sit-
uations all around the world. 116 PMCs handle a range of tasks from
protecting NGOs while they provide health and food aid, to protect-
ing innocents during civil unrest to quickly deploying a strong force to
stop genocide..1 7 Indeed, in some cases they may be able to handle
their assigned task more efficiently and at less cost than when states
send their own troops either unilaterally or as part of an international
effort.118 In addition, rather than sending their own troops, countries
can hire and send private, professional soldiers to conflict areas. In
such situations, a country or a coalition's ability to exert force and
sustain control over the situation may be less likely to suffer from the
effects of diminishing home-front support that often ensues as soldier
casualties increase.
The UN especially is in need of a new solution to address an in-
creasingly unstable world 1 9 and in 2001 sought to raise its security
budget 300 percent.1 20 After the Cold War, militaries shrank, but in
contrast, by 1993 UN peacekeeper deployment was at its peak with
82,000 troops stationed across the world.12' That number steadily de-
clined to 1000 by 1999.122 Today, however, the demand for
peacekeeping forces is high again with the projected levels of troops
reaching 45,000, if mission estimates for Burundi, Haiti, Ivory Coast,
and Sudan are met.1 23 Enter the PMC.
During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Executive Outcomes of-
fered to respond on short notice and at less cost than a multi-national
116. See Singer, Humanitarians, supra note 57, at 14-15.
117. Id. at 15; see also SINGER, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting Executive Outcomes'
proposal for Rwanda entailing deployment of 1500 personnel within fourteen days of hire
for a cost of $600,000 per day as opposed to the slower responding UN force, which cost $3
million per day); see Traci Hukill, Should Peacekeepers Be Privatized? NAT'L J., May 15, 2004,
1526, 1526 (noting the PMC trade group, International Peace Operations Association
("IPOA"), offered to supply troops to address the genocide in Darfur).
118. See infra text surrounding notes 122-123.
119. See Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Conflict
and Its Implications, PARAMETERS, Winter 2002-2003, at 104, 114 (noting projected increase
in failing states).
120. SINGER, supra note 2, at 82.
121. Id. at 59.
122. Id.
123. See Hukill, supra note 117, at 1526.
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force. 124  Kofi Annan, then UN Undersecretary General for
Peacekeeping, considered that offer in part because of the UN's expe-
rience in Somalia a few years prior. The actions of soldiers-not con-
tractors-in Somalia resulted in the United States, Canada, Belgium,
and Italy investigating and, in some instances, prosecuting their own
soldiers for atrocities committed during Operation Restore Hope. 12 5
As a result, countries were wary of sending their troops. 1 2 6
Yet when Annan faced his choice in Rwanda, he concluded "the
world may not be ready to privatize peace."1 2 7 The current UN Under-
secretary for Peacekeeping's position regarding use of PMCs reflects
that sentiment: "It's not going to go anywhere. Forget about it."128
Nonetheless, despite this strong rejection by the office of peacekeep-
ing, other UN organs have hired PMCs to provide security and mili-
tary muscle in situations requiring rapid reactions 29 and to aid in de-
mining.a3 0
It is notjust the UN that requires additional security in providing
humanitarian aid. NGOs, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, World Vision, and World Wildlife Fund, have begun hiring
PMCs for such services as well. 13 1
In addition, PMCs have begun to recognize this large potential
market for their services. De-mining operations alone, which the UN
routinely outsources, has an estimated market of $400 million.' 32 An-
other indication of the importance of this sector to the PMC indus-
124. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 185-86 (noting Executive Outcomes proposal for
Rwanda entailing deployment of 1500 personnel within fourteen days of hire for a cost of
$600,000 as opposed to the slower responding UN force which cost $3 million per day).
125. See Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human
Rights, 12 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 280 (2000).
126. See Hukill, supra note 117, at 1526.
127. See id. at 1526.
128. See id. at 1527 (quoting David Wimhurst, a spokesman in the office of the UN
Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations).
129. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 184-85.
130. See id. at 82.
131. See id.; see also Singer, Humanitarians, supra note 57, at 14-15 (stating "the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, and World Vision have used PMFs to protect their
facilities and staff in hostile environments such as Sierra Leone and the Congo, while envi-
ronmental groups like the World Wildlife Fund have dealt with the firms in seeking to
protect endangered species from well-armed poachers."); FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRt-
VATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, 56-59 http://
www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf (noting United Nations' use of PMCs in Si-
erra Leone for logistical support and suggesting that United Nations in one sense "em-
ploys . . . mercenary forces" as some countries send peacekeeping troops for "financial
reasons").
132. See id.
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try's future can be seen in the establishment of the trade group,
International Peace Operations Association ("IPOA"),133 whose mem-
bers include names familiar to the PMC industry: AirScan, Armor-
Group, Blackwater U.S.A., and MPRI.134 IPOA states that it "is a
501 (c) (6) non-profit organization of companies, individuals, and non-
governmental organizations who provide services related to conflict
alleviation and avoidance, post-conflict reconstruction, and emer-
gency humanitarian rescue worldwide."1 35
Perhaps taking his cue from Executive Outcomes' proposal for
Rwanda, around May 2004 IPOA President Doug Brooks contacted his
constituents to develop a proposal for privatizing peacekeeping in Su-
dan. 13 6 The proposal was striking when compared to possible UN
costs. One year of service in Sudan using "a combination of high-tech
aerial surveillance equipment and a relatively low number (3000) of
U.N. blue-helmet troops, $30 million. Forty million dollars, if the
firms handled the peacekeeping payroll." 137 While no hard number is
in place for operations in Sudan, the African Union, which headed
the efforts to supply troops to the area, indicated that 5000 troops
could have been quickly sent but at the cost of hundreds of millions of
dollars. 13 8 The projected $418 million cost for a 5600 person
peacekeeping mission in Burundi-a country the size of Maryland 3 9
as opposed to Sudan's 2,505,810 square kilometers 4 0 -further high-
lights the gulf between the costs of PMC services and international
organization run missions.
Thus, PMCs present a conundrum. On one hand, evidence shows
PMCs are capable of human rights abuses and severe criminal acts
with little or no recourse available to address the violations. This as-
pect of the PMC industry has led some to see PMCs as simply merce-
naries who should not be employed or even considered as an option:
"So you get a gang of mercenaries in there, basically. Who do they
133. See Int'l Peace Operations Ass'n, Background, http://www.ipoaonline.org/back-
ground.htm (last visited May 30, 2005).
134. See Int'l Peace Operations Ass'n, Members, http://www.ipoaonline.org/back-
ground/members.htm (last visited May 30, 2005).
135. See Int'l Peace Operations Ass'n, Background, http://www.ipoaonline.org/back-
ground.htm (last visited May 30, 2005).
136. See Hukill, supra note 117, at 1526.
137. See id.
138. See Edith M. Lederer, Associated Press, African Force for Darfur Not Yet Ready, Oct. 6,
2004 (Westlaw, AP Online Regional: Middle East, 10/6/04 APONLINE 06:49:59).
139. See Hukill, supra note 117, at 1526.
140. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WoRLD FACrooK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica-
tions/factbook/geos/su.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
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report to? Who controls them? It's a nonstarter."14 Yet, on the other
hand, there is evidence showing that PMCs can provide useful services
and fill gaps when traditional military help is unavailable. Indeed, af-
ter examining the use of PMCs and recognizing the problems inher-
ent in hiring them, the British government concluded "that an
outright ban on all military activity abroad by private military compa-
nies would be counterproductive.' ' 42
I. Proposed Solutions
One solution regarding regulating PMCs embraces using interna-
tional law and bodies to establish a system to license and rein in PMCs
such that PMCs would face an international criminal court and/or a
sort of excommunication from the marketplace if they worked for ille-
gitimate clients or on illegitimate matters.143 This position, though at-
tractive in the abstract and perhaps a laudable, long-term goal, fails to
address the immediate problems of regulating PMCs. Put simply,
while the international community debates what this body would look
like, its rules, and what constitutes legitimate as opposed to illegiti-
mate work, PMCs will continue to be employed with no regulation in
place. Indeed, given the difficulty in defining what a mercenary is,'4
the lack of support for the UN's International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, and
length of time it has taken to obtain even twenty-six ratifications of the
Convention, 145 an international solution does not appear practical.' 46
141. See Hukill, supra note 117, at 1527 (quoting David Wimhurst, a spokesman in the
office of the UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations). Yet this position
ignores the fact that even when the international community manages to cobble together a
force, multi-national forces do not fare much better than PMCs and suffer from the same
problems of command and control and in some cases human rights violations. See SINGER,
supra note 2, at 59 (noting that the nature of the UN often results in under equipped,
lowest common denominator military groups leading to inefficiency and instances of one
group refusing to take orders from another); Gibney et al., supra note 125, at 279-280
(noting possible involvement of UN soldiers in human rights violations during Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia).
142. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMIrEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, NINTH REPORT OF SES-
SION 2001-02, H.C. 922, 102.
143. Singer, War, supra note 112, at 544-46.
144. See supra Part I.C.; see also Eric Rosand, The Security Council as "Global Legislator"
Ultra Vires or Ultra Innovative?, 28 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 542, 573-76, & n.152 (examining the
UN Security Council's ability to issue binding resolutions on all members absent non-Se-
curity Council members' input and/or vote and noting the International Convention
Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries "took nine years to
negotiate." Id. at 576 n.152).
145. See Shaista Shameem, Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Statement at the 61st
Session of the Commission on Human Rights: The Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Vio-
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In addition, given the United States' reluctance to submit to the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 147 even if an international system were er-
ected, one must question whether the United States would agree to
join that system.
Rather than wait for an international solution some suggest that
states are best situated to license and regulate PMCs. 148 Though likely
a more viable solution in that a single state should be able to move
more quickly to establish an internal regulatory system, an examina-
tion of this approach shows that how a given state tries to regulate
PMCs determines the state's success in doing so. In short, when a state
over-regulates the industry, the PMCs tend to pack-up and open shop
in a more hospitable country,149 or the regulating country's laws are
so permissive that PMCs are able to operate with little to no over-
sight.150 Nonetheless, examining international and state possibilities
for PMC regulation provides insight in how to fashion a system to reg-
ulate the PMC industry.
A. International Licensing and Regulatory Bodies Will Not Cure
the Problem
Peter Singer purports that "given the ability of PM[C]s to global-
ize and escape local regulation, [a system to regulate PMCs] must be
international to be effective." 151 Singer argues that an international
lating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determina-
tion 4 (Mar. 18, 2005). in 61st Session of the UN Comm. On Human Rights, Web
Monitoring & Documentation, http://www.unchr.info/61st/docs/0318-Item5-
SR%20Mercenaries.pdf (last visited June 24, 2005) ("So far, only 26 States, most recently
New Zealand, have ratified the International convention prohibiting the use of merce-
naries. Movement on this issue has been disappointing.").
146. Even Mr. Singer, who is a strong proponent of international regulation of PMCs
and offered his own analysis of how best to regulate the industry, though still maintaining
that "the solution [to regulating PMCs] will require international involvement," has re-
cently acknowledged that while "[p]roposals to update the international antimercenary
laws and to create a UN body to sanction and regulate PM[C]s have already been made[,]
... any such international effort will take years." See P.W. Singer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN
An'., Mar. 1, 2005, at 119, 132.
147. SeeJuan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Secur-
ity Companies, International Law, and the New World Order, 34 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 75, 152 (1998);
see also Gaul, supra note 112, at 1520-21 (arguing that new legislation to regulate PMCs
must be drafted and should include a legislative veto provision, define regulated contracts
based on type rather than dollar amount, and require ongoing quarterly reports by
Congress).
148. Id.
149. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 118.
150. See infra Part III.C.
151. Singer, War, supra note 112, at 544.
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registration process may initially be used to screen firms and establish
"initial qualifications of firms." 15 2 Singer suggests that perhaps an in-
ternational body operating, for example, under the auspices of the
UN and informed by "governments, the academy, NGOs, and the
firms themselves, could establish the parameters of the issues and lay
out potential forms of regulation, evaluation tools, and codes of con-
duct."153 The body would audit PMCs, thus giving them legitimacy
and making them more attractive to non-UN clients. 154 A key part of
Singer's plan requires the body to review licensed PMCs' contracts to
assure that PMCs do not "work for unsavory clients or engage in con-
tracts that are contrary to the public good."155
The body could also require operational oversight including ap-
pointing observers who would make sure the PMCs obey the laws of
war and do not breach their contracts with the hiring body.156 In addi-
tion, Singer suggests that the body impose more than market-based
punishment so that it could address human rights violations.1 57 One
way to accomplish this goal entails the governing body requiring the
PMC and its employees to agree to the jurisdiction of the host state, or
"extradition to third party states that have universal jurisdiction laws"
with an appropriate international legal body, such as the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") as the forum for the case. 158
As a simple matter, however, the ICC is not equipped nor is it
designed to handle the full range of crimes that might arise, such as
murder, drug dealing, extortion, or other common crimes. The ICC
states:
The Court's jurisdiction will be limited to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole. It will there-
fore have jurisdiction with respect to the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, all of which are fully de-
fined in the Statute and further elaborated by the Elements of
Crimes. 159
In addition, some hold "the core of what international criminal
trials seek to achieve [is] the attribution and calibration of individual
152. Id. at 545.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 545-46.
155. Id. at 546.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Int'l Crim. Ct.: Jurisdiction, http://www.icc-cpi.int/ataglance/whatistheicc/u-
risdiction.html (last visited June 26, 2005).
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responsibility for mass atrocities"1 60 and note that "[e]xisting interna-
tional criminal courts exclusively punish individuals (as opposed to
other types of legal entities, such as states or corporations), and im-
prisonment constitutes the principal form of punishment im-
posed." 61 Thus, when dealing with a PMC's violation of human rights
or criminal law, the international criminal legal system has a void.
To fill this gap, one solution is the establishment of a new inter-
national criminal court to handle such matters, or expansion of the
ICC's current mandate to include crimes addressed in this Article.
Nevertheless, that solution will not change a practical matter. The
United States is a prime, if not the prime, employer of PMCs. The
United States, however, is not inclined to recognize or submit to the
jurisdiction of international courts of justice.
Rather, the current United States Administration under Presi-
dent Bush is vehemently opposed to the ICC and has withdrawn the
United States' signature on the implementation treaty, pushed for bi-
lateral agreements guaranteeing that other countries not hand over
United States nationals to the ICC, and passed the American Ser-
vicemembers' Protection Act. 162 The Act prohibits the United States'
cooperation with the ICC, authorizes forces to free United States per-
sonnel held by the ICC, withdraws aid to certain countries supporting
the ICC, and prohibits United States peacekeeping unless United
States troops are granted immunity from the ICC.163 Furthermore,
lest one think that a different administration would have embraced
the ICC, when pressed during his presidential campaign Senator
Kerry stated, "I don't believe the United States should join the Inter-
national Criminal Court until our concerns are addressed and the
Court develops a solid track record of fair prosecutions of the world's
160. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL.
L. REV. 75, 79 (2005).
161. Id. at 82 (citations omitted).
162. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INT'L CIUM. CT., http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited June 20, 2005); Marjorie Cohn, How U.S.
Opposition to International Court Jeopardizes U.S. Troops, CNN.coM, Sept. 10, 2003, http://
edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/ 0/findlaw.analysis.cohn.peacekeepers/ (last visited
June 20, 2005). For a statement regarding the Bush Administration's position regarding
the ICC and its use of bilateral agreements, see generallyJohn R. Bolton, Under Sec'y for
Arms Control & Int'l Sec., Remarks to the Federalist Society: The United States and the
International Criminal Court, (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15158.htm
(last visited July 11, 2005).
163. See HUM. RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 162.
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worst criminals." 164 Therefore, regardless of which administration
controls the United States, the basic principle is clear, the United
States is not in favor of other tribunals or countries trying United
States citizens for crimes.
Consequently, while establishing a system whereby PMCs are li-
censed and regulated has possibilities, the difficulties in forming and
managing such a system show that it will be some time before such a
system can be successfully put in place. Added to the operational and
bureaucratic concerns is the fact that achieving the endorsement of
significant international players, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, will be difficult. The United States will either cate-
gorically oppose the system or not considerjoining such a system until
after it is fully laid out. The United Kingdom has begun studying the
issue but faced political opposition to its proposals to regulate the in-
dustry thus far.16 5 For these reasons, a more practical, immediate solu-
tion is needed.
B. Single State Regulation and Licensing
A wrinkle on the licensing solution is the argument that a licens-
ing regime for PMCs will work most efficiently if the PMCs are "tied to
states" and that "[tihe best way of attaching [PMC] activity to state
responsibility is for each [PMC] contract to be licensed by exporting
[the] government."' 166 Similar to Singer's solution, this position calls
for legislation and oversight. As the author points out, the United
States requires that defense companies wishing to export defense ser-
vices must register with the Office of Defense Trade Controls, which
then issues a license for the export.167 The procedure allows for on-
164. See Joe Lauria, Kerry Opposes Role in Tribunal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 5, 2004, at A10,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/politics/president/bush/articles/200 4 /10/05/
kerry-opposes-rolein-tribunal/ (last visited June 20, 2005).
165. See Stephen Fidler, Private Security: Operating in a Troubled Vacuum, FT.coM, May 6,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7125725 ("The UK has been reticent to introduce regulation.
A 2002 government green paper discussing the arguments for and against a licensing re-
gime for private security companies famously made no recommendations. This is partly
because of the sensitivity of the 'mercenary' issue among Labour MPs.").
166. Zarate, supra note 147, at 152; see also Gaul, supra note 112, at 1520-21 (arguing
that new legislation to regulate PMCs must be drafted and should include a legislative veto
provision, define regulated contracts based on type rather than dollar amount, and require
ongoing quarterly reports by Congress).
167. Zarate, supra note 147, at 155-56.
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going oversight during the term of the contract. 168 Israel follows simi-
lar procedures. 169
In at least one instance, however, that tactic, when applied to the
PMC industry, has failed. South Africa, home to the former Executive
Outcomes, passed legislation that closely regulated PMCs 170 and that
some argued signaled the end of PMCs ability to offer "implementa-
tion and combat services. 171 As a result, the PMCs disbanded and em-
braced the option of moving to a less restrictive country.1 72 In a sense,
Executive Outcomes' corporate body died and reincarnated not in
one new body, but in several new corporate forms in friendlier
countries.173
Hence, we are left with a problem. On one hand, a single state
may be more effective or efficient in regulating PMCs, but PMCs can
easily pick up and move to a new country whenever their host country
places legislative controls on them that PMCs find unacceptable. On
the other hand, international organizations can try and establish a sys-
tem of registration and regulation. This solution, however, creates yet
another international body, asks the United States and other coun-
tries to recognize the new body, and requires companies and their
employees to submit to the jurisdiction of not only a foreign power
but an international power. This is inadequate, however, as interna-
tional bodies are not likely to exert jurisdiction over the United States
or its companies in the near future.
C. Current United States Law Is Limited
Two acts, the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") 174 and MEJA, pro-
vide some recourse against PMCs. Yet both acts are severely limited in
168. Id. at 156.
169. Id. at 156-57.
170. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 118.
171. See id.; cf Can Anyone Curb Aftica's Dogs ofWar?, EcoNoMIST,Jan. 16, 1999, at 41,41
("Last year [South Africa] passed a law banning mercenary activity by its nationals. On
January 1st, Executive Outcomes ("EO"), South Africa's best-known mercenary firm, 'ter-
minated' its operations. A swift success for high-minded legislation? Not really.").
172. See SINGER, supra note 2, at 118; accord Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?, ECON-
oMIsT, Jan. 16, 1999, at 41 (noting "EO's headquarters near Pretoria is still staffed. Former
personnel are still available to provide their services elsewhere. Many former EO soldiers
have turned up in Sierra Leone with a company called Lifeguard."). In addition, even if
Executive Outcomes had not disbanded, apparently it would have been welcomed in other
countries even under its old name. See Zarate, supra note 147, at 102 n.187 (noting three
countries' offers to host Executive Outcomes).
173. See id.
174. See Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private
Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325,
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their reach. Some point to the ATCA and recent cases interpreting
the ATCA as providing an appropriate and viable basis for prosecuting
PMCs under international law.1 75 Yet, as the Supreme Court's ruling
regarding the ATCA makes clear, only foreign nationals may bring a
suit under the ATCA, they must do so in the United States, and they
can only do so for acts that violate a self-executing treaty signed by the
United States or "the customs and usages of civilized nations.". 76
Thus, the ATCA's reach and power is limited, and many common
crimes are not subject to it.
In contrast, MEJA begins to provide some measure of assurance
that PMC employees will be prosecuted for their crimes. Nonetheless,
MEJA still has serious gaps in that it applies only to PMCs who con-
tract directly with the DOD. After the Abu Ghraib prison events high-
lighted that some PMC employees not employed by the DOD did not
fall under the purview of MEJA, members of Congress dutifully raced
to fix this error by proposing the MEJA Clarification Act' 77 and the
similar Contract Accountability Act. 78 Both seek to expand the Act to
include PMC personnel by removing the limitation that they have to
be hired by the DOD; under the proposed acts any PMC personnel
hired by any agency would come under MEJA so long as their hiring was
in support of a DOD mission.179 Neither of the bills, however, have yet
been passed. Likewise an amendment to the Ronald W. Reagan Na-
339-343 (2003) (examining ways in which the ATCA might be used to hold PMCs account-
able under United States law).
175. See id. at 349 (arguing that under the joint action test articulated in Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2002), courts could establish secondary liability for corporations violating international
law). In addition, the Federal Tort Claims Act may provide a defense to any tort claim
against PMCs. The problem, however, is that a PMC would have to show it was operating
under direct orders or specifications of the government. Demonstrating such a link might
be possible in cases such as those presented by Abu Ghraib but would not address situa-
tions such as those regarding DynCorp in Bosnia. See generally AnthonyJ. Sebok, Assessing
Possible Tort Claims by Iraqi Prisoners, CNN.coM, May 19, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/
LAW/05/19/sebok.iraq.prisoners.torts (discussing the possible application of the ATCA to
Iraqi prisoner claims and noting that under Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2001) and its reading of Boylev. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the govern-
ment contractor defense was not likely to apply to Federal Tort Claims Act claims).
176. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machian, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756, 2766 (2004),
(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
177. MEJA Clarification Act, H.R. 4390, 108th Cong. (2003).
178. Contract Accountability Act, H.R. 4387, 108th Cong. (2003).
179. See Enforcing U.S. Policies Against Trafficking in Persons: How Is the U.S. Military Do-
ing?:Joint Issue Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services and the Commission on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe (Helsinki Commission), 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Martina
Vandenberg), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/Issue%2OForums/Helsinki%209-
21-04/VandenbergStatement.pdf (last visited June 12, 2005).
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tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005180 extends juris-
diction over PMC personnel regardless of which agency has hired
them but again states that they must be hired "in support of a Defense
Department mission abroad."
1 8 1
For all the press spin about accountability, none of the proposed
or passed changes to the law address the situations where the DOD is
not involved. Furthermore, there are numerous missions in which the
DOD is not involved, but where the United States should exert over-
sight and jurisdiction over PMCs. 182 Thus, we are left with the ques-
tion of how one can begin to regulate the PMC industry such that all
contractors, not just those hired as part of a DOD endeavor, are held
accountable for their actions.
IV. A Regulated PMC Industry
Two areas present ways the PMC industry may remain a useful,
flexible tool for governments and NGOs while still being held ac-
countable for, if not less prone to, human rights violations and crimi-
nal acts: contract control and legislation. By using both contract and
statutory remedies, a system can be created that would allow the gov-
ernment and the industry to attempt a version of self-regulation, but
should those efforts or political will falter, the public would have the
opportunity to pursue PMC violations of the law.
180. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 375 118 Stat. 1811, § 1088 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3267); accord Enforcing U.S.
Policies Against Trafficking in Persons: How Is the U.S. Military Doing?: Joint Issue Before the H.
Comm. on Armed Services and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki
Commission), 108th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Martina Vandenberg), available at http://
www.house.gov/hasc/Issue%2OForums/Helsinki%209-21-04/VandenbergStatement.pdf
(last visited June 12, 2005) (noting amendment approval and restriction to contractors
working "'in support of a Department of Defense mission abroad.'" (quoting the Sessions
and Schumer Amendment to the Fiscal Year 2005 defense authorization bill); Jennifer K.
Elsea, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Treatment of Prisoners in Iraq: Selected Legal Issues,
RL32395, at CRS-18 (updated May 19, 2005).
181. See id.
182. It should be noted that the United States government is indeed trying to prose-
cute a civilian contractor under a provision of the Patriot Act that allows exercise ofjuris-
diction over the contractor if he or she was under the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. The assertion of jurisdiction, however, is being chal-
lenged on the grounds that the contractor was not under such jurisdiction while con-
tracted in Afghanistan. See William A. Holmes, Associated Press, CIA Contractor Accused in
Beating Claims U. S. Has No Jurisdiction, Feb. 11, 2005 (Westlaw, AP Alert: Connecticut, 02/
11/05 AP Alert - CT 18:01:35). This argument applies to situations where PMCs are hired
by the United States government and to situations such as those described above. For ex-
ample, DynCorp in Bosnia would not fall under this extension ofjurisdiction in any event.
As such, the need for further legislation to close the jurisdiction gap remains.
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A. Contract Control
Governments, regional security groups, NGOs, and multi-na-
tional corporations are the main entities who need and can afford to
hire PMCs for the types of activities that would give rise to the abuse
issues. Of course, rogue groups could hire PMCs, but as long as those
who can and need to hire PMCs firmly refuse to deal with PMCs who
service rogue groups, PMCs working with rogue groups should not be
a problem. 183 Given the size of the contracts and the preference for a
steady flow of business, PMCs are apt to desire contracts with estab-
lished legitimate concerns rather than test a prohibited market' 8 4 and
find themselves categorized as rogue or mercenary operations. Finally,
and most importantly for this Article, given the United States' current
market power, the United States alone can wield tremendous power
in determining the way in which PMCs behave. 185
Contracts routinely contain choice of law, jurisdiction, and war-
ranties and representations clauses. The United States government
could easily mandate that all contracts for services, as defined under
the ITAR, include clauses whereby the PMC and its employees agree
that the law governing the contract will be United States law, the PMC
and its employees agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the United
States regardless of where the services are performed, and the PMC
warrants and represents that it provides human rights and local law
training and guidance to all personnel to be deployed under the con-
tract. In addition, such training would be required to meet certain
183. See Zarate, supra note 147, at 148-150 (arguing in favor of market forces as limit-
ing PMCs willingness to engage in mercenary behavior and stating "much of [PMCs'] reve-
nue originates from their home governments, who are long-term clients; therefore,
[PMCs] want to adhere to the policies and interests of their home states.").
184. See id.
185. For example, almost ninety-six percent of DynCorp's business comes from one
client, the United States government. Peter W. Singer, Warriors for Hire, SALON.COM, Apr.
15, 2004, available at http://www.brook.edu/iews/articles/fellows/singer2004415.htm;
see also Schwartz & Watson, supra note 32, at 102 (noting the Pentagon alone spends ap-
proximately $30 billion on PMCs); CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY. POST-WAR CONTRACTORS
RANKED BY TOTAL CONTRACT VALUE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN FROM 2002 THROUGH JULY 1,
2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/resources.aspx?act=total (documenting ap-
proximately $50 billion in PMC contracts for Iraq and Afghanistan alone) (last accessed
June 15, 2005); accord FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS
FOR REGULATION, 2001-02, H.C. 577, 12, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/merce-
naries,0.pdf (noting that "most private military companies are not exclusively involved in
business overseas. The largest PMCs, in the United States, provide a range of services prin-
cipally for the US Government which include logistics services, drawing up specifications
for equipment and testing it, training and strategic advice. For most of these companies
activities abroad are a relatively small part of their business.").
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detailed criteria and training procedures (e.g., international, United
States, and local laws to be covered; number of hours of training; min-
imum qualifications for trainers; etc.) as set forth by the United States
government.
Additionally, the government could require that the corporation
place attorneys, or even provide independent attorneys to be placed
with the pre-deployed and post-deployed group to carry out the con-
tract.186 These attorneys would function as a private Judge Advocates
General who would participate in the contract at all levels, including
aiding in legal training or advising regarding the PMC's conduct in
the field to monitoring activities that run afoul of the contract and/or
the law. Despite the recent pressures on attorneys to provide yes-men
answers as was the case in the so-called torture memos,'8 7 an indepen-
dent, private attorney corps staffed by attorneys from groups such as
Lawyers Without Borders,l ss would more successfully provide true
counsel to those on the ground and not be as susceptible to
manipulation.
By adhering to such precepts, the United States government
would begin to influence the PMC industry such that any company
within the industry would be better off instituting standards that meet
or exceed the government standards as a way to demonstrate that it is
fit to win the lucrative contracts the United States government is capa-
ble of executing. Indeed, the government could require that even
before qualifying to bid on a contract, the PMC must attest to and
verify its capacity to meet the minimum standards.
186. • PMCs may consider instituting such practices on their own as gesture towards
their commitment to protecting human rights.
187. See Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draw Focus on Bush, WASHt. PosT,
June 9, 2004, at A3. In addition, as one member of the Judge Advocate's Office has noted,
proper field supervision of contractors by contracting officers, with the power to negotiate
the deal, influences compliance with MEJA and raises issues regarding chain of command.
Commanders must have proper, ultimate control of personnel in battle to ensure that
necessary military support services are in place at all times. See generally Maj. Joseph R.
Perlak, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: Implications for Contractor Personnel 169
MIL. L. REV. 92 (2001). Accordingly, the idea that attorneys with their duty to uphold the
law and counsel clients regarding the best course of action should be involved in oversee-
ing PMC contractors is arguably analogous to the military's use of contracting officers and
the Judge Advocate General's Office for oversight of PMCs.
188. Lawyers Without Borders is a non-profit organization and claims to be the
world's largest group of volunteer lawyers from around the globe who stand ready
to offer pro bono service to worldwide projects and initiatives. [Its] goal is to
provide legal support to Rule of Law projects and initiatives in the human rights
and nation building sectors at low or significantly discounted cost.
Lawyers Without Borders: Crossing Borders to Make a Difference, http://
www.lawyerswithoutborders.org/ (last visited July 8, 2005).
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Insofar as the civilian contractors were not or have not been pros-
ecuted8 9 for alleged crimes and human rights abuses in Bosnia, Peru,
Columbia, and Abu Ghraib because the United States has claimed it
did not have jurisdiction or there is a question regarding the law at
issue, these requirements would begin to eliminate such scenarios and
plug large holes in bringing to justice the perpetrators of rape, sex
trade of women, and torture. To be clear, the government's
prosecutorial discretion would remain intact, and it could easily
choose not to act. Nonetheless, these provisions would reduce the gov-
ernment's ability to offer facile reasons as to why it has not acted when
it ought to have.
B. Legislative Actions
1. Simple Fixes
The first steps in fixing legislation relating to the use of PMCs are
clear: reduce, if not eliminate, the $50 million requirement that trig-
gers congressional notice.190 MEJA and its proposed amendments do
indeed try to provide a measure of control over PMCs. Nevertheless,
MEJA and its proposed amendments are hindered by the narrow fo-
cus on the DOD.
Congress should expand MEJA so that it encompasses not just
DOD related contracts, but contracts between any part of the govern-
ment-e.g., between the State, Department of Justice, the CIA, the
FBI and any PMC. For practical purposes, using the definition of con-
tractor under the ITAR would address slippery slope arguments sug-
gesting that all contracts by Homeland Security, for example, or some
other large organ of the United States government currently exempt
from MEJA, would be encompassed by the amendments. That said, it
might be wise for the government to require heightened training and
oversight for groups such as Transportation Security Administration,
the entity responsible for protecting United States transportation sys-
tems, including screening people and baggage at airports. 191
Simple legislative fixes are, however, only a starting point. If en-
acted they would, even without more action, begin to address the
189. See Perlak, supra note 187, at 93 (stating that "[ifn an unacceptable number of
cases, these civilians have escaped prosecution altogether" (citing Department of Defense
and General Accounting Office reports to the same effect and calling for legislation)).
190. See Avant, supra note 8; Gaul, supra note 112, at 1520-21; Singer, War, supra note
112, at 548.
191. See TSA.gov: About TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=7 (last visited
June 24, 2005).
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problems in an unregulated PMC industry. Still, if we are to address
problems related to PMCs' field violations of the law, more complex
legislation is required.
2. Whistleblower Protection
Additional creative legislative changes, such as to create
whistleblower protections, would aid in preventing future abuses by
PMCs and their employees. This is particularly so given that PMC con-
tracts are carried out far from the United States, resulting in uninvesti-
gated and unpunished problem situations in the absence of people on
location willing to speak up. Indeed, if DynCorp's reaction to two
whistleblowers in Bosnia is any indication, those seeking to bring
abuses to light will have to overcome great fear of retribution if they
are to do so. As such, MEJA should be amended to include a
whistleblower provision similar to the one currently contained in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley").192
Indeed, much the same rationale behind the inclusion of the
whistleblower provision in Sarbanes-Oxley applies to the argument for
including such protection in MEJA, in part because of the parallels
between the large corporations Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to govern and
the PMC industry, which is made up of similar large corporate enti-
ties. In passing Sarbanes-Oxley, the Senate found that, although gov-
ernment employees are protected by current law when they "act in the
public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no similar protec-
tion for employees of publicly traded companies who blow the whis-
tle."1 9 3 Further, the Senate stated that "[w]ith an unprecedented
portion of the American public investing in these companies and de-
pending upon their honesty, this distinction does not serve the public
good."' 94 Similarly, regarding the PMC industry, with an unprece-
dented portion of American military and international policy and ac-
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2005). Though other whistleblower statutes exist, there is
no overarching whistleblower protection in federal law, and as such specific legislation
must be passed to address protection in specific situations, such as the one presented when
considering how best to address the regulation of PMCs. See DARREN A. FEIDER, FEDERAL
WHISTLEBLOWER AND RETALIATION LAws, 1-2, http://www.wkg.com/media/Feider%20arti-
cle.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005) ("There is, however, no single federal law prohibiting
employers in general from retaliating against whistieblowers. There is instead a patchwork
of statutes and regulations covering various areas of business and industry" and citing to
more than twenty-five different statutes addressing whistleblower protection).
193. 148 CONG. REc. S7418-01, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
194. Id.
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tion being implemented via PMCs, there needs to be protection for
PMC employees who blow the whistle on PMCs.
The Senate also noted other concerns remedied by enacting
Sarbanes-Oxley that similarly exist in the PMC industry context. First,
the Senate indicated that without Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblowers are
subject to different laws depending on where they took the action.1 95
Similarly, the PMC industry operates across numerous international
boundaries easily setting up subsidiaries and using other legal forms
to shield themselves from liabilities or prosecution.
Further, the Senate noted that "most corporate employers, with
help from their lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a
whistleblowing employee under the law."19 6 A national whistleblower
law would cut through the PMCs' ability to retaliate against
whistleblowers, such as may have occurred in the DynCorp Bosnia sit-
uation, where two employees tried to bring to light other DynCorp
employees' possible involvement in prostitution and operating a sex-
slave ring; and yet rather than being rewarded for alerting their super-
iors to the possible violations of the law, they were fired and ended up
bringing wrongful termination suits against DynCorp. 19 7 In addition,
given that the acts often affect the United States government, either
directly in its pocketbook or generally in its perception on the world
stage, protecting whistleblowers at a federal level demonstrates that
the government takes these issues seriously and intends to stop them.
Regarding Sarbanes-Oxley, the Senate stated, "U.S. laws need to en-
courage and protect those who report fraudulent activity that can
damage innocent investors in publicly traded companies" and cited a
letter from the National Whistleblower Center, the Government Ac-
countability Project, and Taxpayers Against Fraud calling Sarbanes-
Oxley "the single most effective measure possible to prevent recur-
rences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to the nation's finan-
cial markets."' 198 Similarly, "U.S. laws need to encourage and protect"
PMC whistleblowers so that we have an "effective measure ... to pre-
vent recurrences of the [Abu Ghraib and Bosnia] debacle Es]. ' 199
Borrowing language from Sarbanes-Oxley, 200 whistleblower pro-
tection in MEJA could be drafted as follows:
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Capps, Outside, supra note 5.
198. 148 CONG. REc. S7418-01, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
199. Id.
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
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No company [subject to ITAR or MEJA], or any officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may dis-
charge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner
discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the employee to
provide information, cause information to be provided, or other-
wise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the em-
ployee reasonably believes constitutes 2° '
"conduct outside the United States that would constitute an offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than [one] year if the conduct
had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States"20 2 and/or any provision of Federal law
pertaining to fraud against the United States government or in the
case of public companies fraud against shareholders.
Under the amended Act, employees "fil[ing], caus[ing] to be
filed, testify[ing], participat[ing] in, or otherwise assist[ing] in a pro-
ceeding filed" 20 3 could be protected as well.
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, an employee has ninety days from the oc-
currence of a suspect act to file an action,20 4 but in the PMC context,
that may need to be extended to 180 days to account for the possibil-
ity that employees in remote regions could require more time to file
an action. The remedies could include Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions for
reinstatement, back pay, compensation for special damages including
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees. 20 5
Enforcement could also parallel Sarbanes-Oxley, so that, in the
event of a retaliatory act, the employee would file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor who would have 180 days to issue a final decision.
Otherwise, unless there is bad-faith on the employee's part, the em-
ployee would be allowed to bring suit in federal district court regard-
less of the amount in controversy. 20 6
Though there may be alternate ways to the one outlined to pro-
vide whistleblower protection, whistleblower protection in some man-
ner combined with improved congressional oversight and an
expanded definition of when PMCs are subject to MEJA, would pro-
vide a way to expand jurisdiction over PMCs and a way for those in the
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). The term "lawful" is intended to prevent employees from
using the act as way to disclose trade secrets. 148 CONC. REc. S7418-01, S7419 (daily ed. July
26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a) (2005).
203. See id. § 1514A(a) (2).
204. See id. § 1514A(b).
205. See id. § 1514A(c).
206. See id. § 1514A(b).
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field to help monitor PMC actions that would require the exercise of
such jurisdiction. Yet there is still one type of oversight available for
creating a robust regulatory scheme for PMCs: a public interest cause
of action.
3. Public Interest Cause of Action
The final and perhaps most powerful aspect of the legislative
layer consists of a public interest cause of action. California's Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 ("Proposition 65"
or "Act"), which addresses environmental concerns by allowing a pub-
lic interest cause of action balanced against governmental interests in
pursuing a case, 207 provides a template from which this layer may be
fashioned. In following Proposition 65 as a guide, this layer is related
to a qui tam action under the False Claims Act of 1863,208 which allows
"any person to prosecute a civil fraud-in the name of the United
States-against any person who allegedly makes a false claim to the
United States government. '" 20 9
207. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SArTY ConE § 25249.5-.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
208. See Julie Ann Ross, Citizen Suits California's Proposition 65 and the Lawyer's Ethical
Duty to the Public Interest, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 809, 810 n.4 (1995) (noting relationship of qui
tam to "modern day citizen suit"); accord Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compli-
ance: An Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protection for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 663, 710, n. 317 ("A growing trend in environmental law is the use of the qui tam
provisions of the False Claims Act of 1863 (FCA) to force corporations to abide by environ-
mental reporting requirements."). The False Claims Act is codified at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3732. It should be noted that the use of qui tam actions are subject to some debate
and criticism. See Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REv. 589, 607-618 (2005) (examining private attorney general actions and noting
pro arguments-" [P]rivate attorneys general are a cost-effective means of both pursuing
the public welfare and returning power to the people themselves. For legislatures that
value cheap, robust regulatory enforcement, private attorneys general may present an at-
tractive option." Id. at 610. Con arguments include: private attorneys may be self-interested
and motivated by financial gain, may free-ride by waiting to follow the government's lead
for opportunistic litigation rather than being true investigators, may accept settlements too
easily, and may undermine the provision of consistent agency or government enforcement.
Id. at 607-619 (finding "no definitive resolution to the policy debate over private attorneys
general" and that legislatures resolve the matter differently based on context.)); John
Beisner, et. al., Class Action Cops: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs, 57 STAN. L. REv.
1441, 1457-1460 (2005) (comparing class action private attorney general actions to qui tam
suits and noting that though qui tam actions may allow citizens to bring suits that abuse or
are not part of the policy objectives behind the act enabling a given suit, as opposed to
class actions, the legislature can alter the parameters of the enabling act to prevent such
abuses).
209. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 521, 531 (2005)
(examining the history of qui tam actions and the executive's final authority in such
actions).
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Following this model, this private action layer would examine
what areas are to be subject to the public cause of action-from
human rights laws to United States laws to specific fraud laws to cur-
rent provisions of MEJA-and then provide for the ability to file suit
and the procedure under which such a suit would be filed.
Using the Act as an exemplar, this layer blends government and
private oversight by including injunctive remedies, specific and daily
civil penalties of $2500, detailed notice and minimum threshold re-
quirements for private action, and time limits to allow a public moni-
toring function to exist while maintaining the government's ability to
pursue cases. 210
The Act sets forth a balancing test the court is to consider when
assessing civil penalties:
(A) The nature and extent of the violation.
(B) The number of, and severity of, the violations.
(C) The economic effect of the penalty on the violator.
(D) Whether the violator took good faith measures to comply with
this chapter and the time these measures were taken.
(E) The willfulness of the violator's misconduct.
(F) The deterrent effect that the imposition of the penalty would
have on both the violator and the regulated community as a
whole.
(G) Any other factor that justice may require. 211
Either the Attorney General, a district attorney, or a city attorney for a
city with a population of more than 750,000 people may bring a suit
under Proposition 65.212 Government attorneys in smaller jurisdic-
tions may bring suits provided they receive permission of their district
attorney.213
In addition, anyone may bring an action in the public interest
provided certain requirements are met.21 4 To bring a suit in the pub-
lic interest, one must first give notice to the government attorney with
jurisdiction over the potential case and to the alleged violator of the
Act and wait sixty days before bringing the suit;215 if the State has
picked up the case and is "diligently prosecuting" it, the private action
is no longer allowed. 216 In addition, when alleging that the potential
violator is exposing the public to chemicals that cause cancer or re-
210. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5-13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
211. Id. § 25 249.7 (b) (2).
212. Id. § 25249.7(c).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 25249.7(d).
215. Id. § 25249.7(d)(1).
216. Id. § 25249.7(d) (2).
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productive toxicity, the person bringing the suit must provide a certifi-
cate of merit which:
[S] hall state that the person executing the certificate has consulted
with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experi-
ence or expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data re-
garding the exposure to the listed chemical that is the subject of
the action, and that, based on that information, the person execut-
ing the certificate believes there is a reasonable and meritorious
case for the private action. Factual information sufficient to estab-
lish the basis of the certificate of merit... shall be attached to the
certificate of merit that is served on the Attorney General.2 1 7
Significantly, the factual information on which the certificate is
based is not discoverable unless it "is relevant to the subject matter of
the action and is otherwise discoverable," 218 presumably to protect po-
tential whistleblowers. Nonetheless, after a case is over, the alleged
violator may move for, or the court of its own volition may conduct, an
in camera review of the certificate of merit and the legal theories of
the plaintiff to see whether the basis was real.21 9 If the court deems
the basis to be false, it may bring sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit.220
A parallel statute for PMC regulation would maintain the injunc-
tion power, the daily civil penalty provisions, the required balancing
test for the court, the notice period with the government's ability to
trump the public interest suit, the certificate of merit requirement,
the whistleblower protection, and the penalties for frivolous lawsuits.
If necessary, a heightened pleading requirement or procedural limit,
such as exhausting certain remedies, might be incorporated to limit
further concerns regarding an explosion of suits. In addition, the stat-
ute could require a certain level of pattern and practice before such a
suit would be allowed thereby preventing numerous small-scale, nui-
217. Id. § 25249.7(d)(1).
218. Id. § 25249.7(h)(1).
219. Id. § 25249.7(h) (2).
220. Id. (mandating "If the court finds that there was no credible factual basis for the
certifier's belief that an exposure to a listed chemical had occurred or was threatened,
then the action shall be deemed frivolous within the meaning of Section 128.6 or 128.7 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, whichever provision is applicable to the action." (emphasis ad-
ded)). Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.6(a), the court may order whom-
ever brought the frivolous action to pay attorney's fees and reasonable expenses. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 128.6(a) (West Supp. 2005). California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7 pro-
vides authorization for the court to impose sanctions and punitive damages including but
not limited to attorney's fees and expenses and has the stated of goal of using sanctions as
a deterrent: "It is the intent of the Legislature that courts shall vigorously use its sanctions
authority to deter that improper conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situ-
ated." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 128.7(h) (West Supp. 2005).
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sance suits and focusing on larger scale systemic issues, such as the
ones that occurred in Bosnia and Abu Ghraib.
The advantage of such a system lies in the way in which the viola-
tions are defined. The statute can be written to include human rights
violations, United States laws, specific fraud laws, or simply stay with
the current MEJA provision that "an offense punishable by imprison-
ment for more than [one] year if the conduct had been engaged in
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States ... shall be punished as provided for that offense."22' 1 The stat-
ute, however, would allow the public to aid in policing the contrac-
tors' actions.
Indeed, with the civil penalty provision and the recent questions
regarding PMCs over-charging the government,222 the statute ought
to include fraud (perhaps limited by a high dollar amount) in the
definition and thus rein in contractors and their ability to influence
whether the government pursues or abandons a case. Further, follow-
ing the model of Proposition 65,223 under the proposed PMC system,
the office or person prosecuting the case would receive only a per-
centage of the penalty with the rest going to the harmed agency.
C. The Full System in Action
Assuming that the full system was in place with both contract and
legislative changes implemented, how would it operate? In a likely fu-
ture scenario, suppose the government has become involved with a
peacekeeping or nation-building mission in the Middle East. PMC ser-
vices are requested and most likely are an absolute necessity if the
mission is to succeed because United States and international troops
are scarce and are tasked with ongoing military activities. The PMC in
question is hired for several services, ranging from laundry and food
service, to protecting reconstruction and human aid groups, to guard-
ing prisoners to aiding in interrogation.
Under the contract that the government would require, the PMC
would undergo a baseline of training regarding the law of war, human
221. 18 U.S.C.A., § 3261(a) (2005).
222. See generally MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 108TH CONG., FACT
SHEET HALLIBURTON'S IRAQ CoNTRAcrs Now WORTH OVER $10 BILLION (2004), http://
democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20041209093532-66409.pdf (last visited June 15,
2005) (noting overcharges and numerous contract violations).
223. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25192(a) (2) (West 2005). To encourage litigation
by private parties, 25% of all civil penalties collected in the action are paid to a private
party who successfully obtains a judgment under California's Safe Drinking Water and
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986. Id. § 25192.12(d).
Summer 2005] HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
rights laws, and pertinent local law. To be clear, this baseline would be
in place for all personne4 including those tending to laundry and food
service. The reason being that privately contracted personnel may be
hired initially to perform support functions, but in the course of a
fluid war (or warlike) situation, the government employer may call
upon the contractor to take up arms. Indeed, the contractors may
take up arms to protect themselves regardless of whether their con-
tract or their employer has asked them to do so.224
Further, the government would likely require that higher, more
sophisticated levels of training be in place for those personnel per-
forming functions whose nature necessarily involves difficult interna-
tional law, law of war, and local law questions. Finally, the government
would be able to demonstrate that it had indeed sought to protect
human rights from the outset, and if the PMC in question deployed
personnel who had not received proper training, the government
could hold the PMC accountable rather than the government taking
the blame.
In the same scenario, suppose that despite these contractual pre-
cautions, it was discovered that employees of a PMC used their posi-
tion as border patrol to deal drugs. In addition, presume that the
number of people involved and the amount of dealing was signifi-
cant-not a Cali cartel drug ring, considered "one of the largest or-
ganized crime syndicates in modem history"225 but large enough that
the Drug Enforcement Agency or a police force would take notice in
the United States. With the legislative changes proposed above-
whistleblower and public right of action statutes in place-the scena-
rio could play out as follows:
One person, also on border patrol, sees the issue and is not will-
ing to be part of the scheme. If the PMC or some organ of the govern-
ment steps up and investigates, with whistleblower protection, she
could cooperate with a reduced fear of reprisal. If, however, the PMC
had not, or appeared unwilling to investigate the matter, she could
report the violation to the Attorney General, her Representative, Sen-
ator, or other appropriate government entity with a greater sense of
employment safety.
224. See Singer, Outsourcing, supra note 61 (noting "[w]hen contractor units are at-
tacked, they must deal with the situation" and that despite restrictions against carrying
"heavy weapons" some have taken to buying grenades and plan on acquiring other such
weapons to protect themselves).
225. SeeJack Dolan, Judge: Drug Case at Risk, MtAmi HERALD, May 30, 2005, at Bi.
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Nevertheless, what if after she reports the matter she finds that
the investigation does not occur or that the PMC's close ties to the
DOD have operated behind the scenes to squash the matter? Likewise,
what if she does not know to whom to turn in the government? In
either of these situations, the public right of action statute comes into
play.
She could approach watchdog groups such as the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights or even Public Citizen, 226 provide them with infor-
mation, and they in turn would be able to pursue the matter. In doing
so, the watchdog group would be held to the high standard set forth
above so that it could only bring suits regarding acts rising to a certain
level of severity. In addition, the watchdog group would act as a screen
for the government in that a single person would not be making a
claim. An organization operating under, and subject to, a specific stat-
ute with penalties for false claims would be involved. In addition, if-
even after being informed by the individual, the watchdog group, or
both-the government inadvertently failed to pursue the action,
stalled, or chose not to pursue the matter, there would be a viable
means of pressing the issue, making it a matter of public concern and
thus perhaps demonstrating to the government that the people do
indeed care about the matter. Indeed, the potential of such an outcry
would encourage the government and the PMC industry to avoid such
an event lest a cumbersome licensing and regulatory system be
deemed the only satisfactory solution.
In contrast, today groups such as at the Center for Constitutional
Rights must pursue cases in Germany227 or try and shoe-horn cases
under the ATCA, which only covers acts that violate a self-executing
treaty signed by the United States or "the customs and usages of civi-
226. The Center for Constitutional Rights "is a non-profit legal and educational organi-
zation dedicated to protecting and advancing the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." See Center for Const. Rights, About
CCR, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/about/mission-vision.asp (last visited June 26, 2005);
Public Citizen was founded in 1971 by Ralph Nader and is a consumer advocacy group that
fights for, among other issues, "openness and democratic accountability in government."
See Public Citizen, About Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/about/ (last visited June
26, 2005); See Public Citizen, Public Citizen 30 Years, http://www.citizen.org/documents/
pctimeline.pdf (last visited June 26, 2005) (detailing milestones in Public Citizen's history
from its founding to 2000).
227. See CENTER FOR CONsT. RIGHTS, CCR SEEKS CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IN GERMANY OF
UNITED STATES OFFICIALS FOR WAR CRIMES IN ABu GHRAIB TORTURE, http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=TCRT9TuSb&Content=471 (last visited May 30,
2005).
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lized nations."228 For PMCs based in the United States and serving the
United States government, with its reluctance to submit to interna-
tional jurisdictions, this system would obviate the necessity of frus-
trated groups bringing claims outside the United States and reduce
the demand for international criminal courts.
Conclusion
The PMC-related abuses, such as the events at Abu Ghraib, the
United States government's use of the PMC industry to implement
illegal policies in South America, and the PMC industry's ability to
defraud the United States government of millions of dollars com-
bined with the increased availability of numerous ex-military person-
nel in the private sector and with the United States' policy choice of
outsourcing as many government functions as possible, has created a
situation where the PMC industry has exploded into a multi-billion
dollar sector not likely to vanish soon. These factors demonstrate that
some level of regulation of the PMC industry is required.
Several proposals have previously been offered to regulate the in-
dustry by establishing international or country-specific licensing and
regulation schemes. These schemes fail to correct the perceived
problems in the PMC industry and they would likely severely reduce
PMCs' efficacy and require submission to the jurisdiction of an inter-
national court. In addition, the schemes would face the difficulties
inherent in trying to categorize the industry and possibly further con-
strain the industry by imposing imprecise or inappropriate categories
and definitions to the industry as part of any proposed regulation
scheme.
In contrast, this Article's proposed system blends market-based
self-regulation with the threat of serious criminal and/or civil litiga-
tion as a fail-safe. The system's advantage to the United States govern-
ment and to the PMC industry is that it maintains the flexibility of an
unregulated, or, rather, a less-regulated industry, while addressing
the serious and important concerns of those who see the lack of ac-
countability and responsibility for serious violations of the law.
One way or another, regulation will come. The United States gov-
ernment and the PMC industry can, of course, continue with limited
solutions that barely address the issues at hand, such as proposing
amendments too limited in their reach and continuing to indicate to
228. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766-67 (2004) (quot-
ing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
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the world that the United States will do as it pleases by not curbing or
punishing abuses by companies it hires. Alternatively, the United
States government could follow a system such as the one set forth in
this Article that gives the government and the PMC industry the
chance to show they can clean-up their act while providing meaning-
ful avenues of recourse if they do not.
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